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The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting
MARCEL KAHAN* & EDWARD ROCK**
Never has voting been more important in corporate law. With greater activ-
ism among shareholders and the shift from plurality to majority voting for
directors, the number of close votes is rising. But is the basic technology of
corporate voting adequate to the task? In this Article, we first examine the
incredibly complicated system of U.S. corporate voting, a complexity that is
driven by the underlying custodial-ownership structure, by dispersed owner-
ship and large trading volumes, and by the rise in short-selling and derivatives.
We identify three ways in which things predictably go wrong: pathologies of
complexity; pathologies of ownership; and pathologies of misalignment of
interests. We then discuss the current legal treatment of these pathologies and
consider a variety of directions for reform, ranging from incremental modi-
fications to fundamental redesign. We show that, absent a fundamental recon-
struction of the ownership structure, the existing system will continue to be
noisy, imprecise, and disturbingly opaque. The problems with the existing
system pose fundamental challenges for both proponents of direct shareholder
democracy, who advocate more-extensive voting rights for shareholders, and
for proponents of indirect shareholder democracy, who advocate deference to a
board of directors, the legitimacy of which ultimately rests on shareholder
elections.
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INTRODUCTION
Never has voting been more important in corporate law. As Eileen Nugent, a
leading mergers and acquisitions (M & A) lawyer commented, “When you are
in the trenches, every vote counts.”1
With the activism of institutional investors and hedge funds in corporate
governance and corporate control, there are more and more closely fought
merger votes. The controversial merger between Compaq and HP squeaked
through with the approval of 51.4% of the shares.2 The AXA/MONY merger
was only approved after a change in the record date, and then only by a margin
of 1.7 million shares (for a total of 53.8%) at a time when 6.2 million shares
were out on loan.3 The Transkaryotic merger was approved by just 52% of the
shares.4
Director elections have likewise become much more important. In takeover
contests, Delaware law, by upholding the poison pill, has channeled the decision
on bids for control into the annual meeting, with the prevailing mode of hostile
acquisitions becoming a bid coupled with a proxy contest to replace the
directors. With the rise of hedge funds, the number of regular proxy contests
unrelated to takeovers has also gone up. In a 2006 proxy contest, Nelson Peltz
succeeded in electing two of five candidates to Heinz’s board.5 The margin of
victory by the Peltz nominees was about 8 million shares out of 250 million
1. E-mail from Edward B. Rock to Eileen Nugent, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
(May 21, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing Ms. Nugent’s comment at an earlier roundtable
discussion).
2. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI ET AL., MEETINGS OF STOCKHOLDERS 7–23 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2006).
3. Bob Drummond, Corporate Voting Charade, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, Apr. 2006, at 96, 96; Floyd
Norris, Holders of MONY Approve $1.5 Billion Sale to AXA, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2004, at C5.
4. In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
5. Teresa F. Lindeman, Dissidents Join Heinz’s Board, Both Sides Pledge Cooperation, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 16, 2006, at A1; Rick Stouffer, It’s Official: Peltz, Weinstein on Heinz Board,
PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Sept. 16, 2006 (stating that Peltz and Weinstein took the two seats as “part of a
five-person slate put forth by the Peltz-led Trian Group”).
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voted, or 3.2%.6 At El Paso Corp., a Houston-based energy company, incum-
bent directors were reelected by approximately 17.2 million votes at a time
when the latest figures showed active short sales of almost 76 million borrowed
shares.7 Director elections have also become an important arena for the expres-
sion of shareholder discontent. Starting with the “just vote no” campaigns,
shareholder activists have now extended the strategy towards pushing firms to
adopt a “majority of the votes cast” standard for director election in place of the
plurality standard. At CVS Caremark, which has adopted a “majority vote” rule
for director elections, Roger Headrick was narrowly reelected to the board on
the basis of votes cast by brokers who had not received instructions from their
clients.8
Finally, shareholder proposals at annual meetings, both mandatory and preca-
tory, are now a fixture of the landscape and an important part of the governance
structure, with numerous close contests.9 For example, at Alaska Air Group’s
May 2005 meeting, a bylaw amendment requiring shareholder approval for
anti-takeover plans fell 2.4 million votes short of the required 75% approval at a
time when 4 million shares had been sold short.10 More recently, a “say on pay”
proposal at Merck failed with 49.2% of the shares in favor and passed at
Verizon with 50.18%.11
But is the existing voting system up to the task? Can it meet the demands that
are placed on it? How confident can we be that the reported outcomes of close
corporate votes reflect the votes actually cast and that the right set of sharehold-
ers was afforded effective voting rights?
The 2000 presidential election in Florida revealed that the technology of
punch card ballots was not sufficient to determine the outcome of a close
political election. The degree of precision, we discovered to our chagrin, was
less than the 0.03% margin of victory.12 We learned that the voting system could
6. See H.J. Heinz Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 33 (Nov. 1, 2006), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/46640/000095015206009785/233861ae10vq.htm (Our estimate is de-
rived from the difference between the votes for Peltz—136 million—and the votes of three board
nominees that Peltz wanted to replace but that were elected—128 million for Bunch, Drosdick, and
Reilley.). It is likely that the board candidate with the next-lowest vote (who was not elected) had
approximately the same votes as these three.
7. Drummond, supra note 3, at 102.
8. Kara Scannell, “Broker Votes”: Opponents May Win One, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2007, at C1.
9. According to Yair Listokin, between 1997 and 2004, there were 714 “close votes” on proposals
put to shareholders, where a vote is defined as “close” if the margin of victory or defeat is 10% or less.
Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones 11, 14, 32 tbl.3 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies
in Law, Econ., and Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 348, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract980695.
10. Drummond, supra note 3, at 102.
11. Roger Cheng & Amol Sharma, Verizon Holders Pass “Say-on-Pay” Plan, WALL ST. J., May 19,
2007, at A3. A preliminary tally at Verizon showed 49% for and 49% against, with the final outcome
only determined after a “recount.” Kaja Whitehouse & Christopher Hinton, Verizon Shareholders May
Get “Say on Pay,” WALL ST. J., May 4, 2007, at B4.
12. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100–01 (2000) (Florida division of elections reported a Bush margin
of 1784 votes out of more than 5.8 million cast).
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not answer the question “who won?” and then had to improvise a procedure to
break the statistical tie. What are the “hanging chads” of corporate voting? And
do we have adequate procedures for breaking statistical ties?
In Part I, we provide background on when shareholders vote, which sharehold-
ers have a right to vote, how votes are counted, and how voting disputes are
resolved. In Part II, we discuss how shares are actually held, transferred, and
voted in the U.S. system, in which approximately 80% of the shares are held by
nominees. In Part III, we analyze the various pathologies that infect the share-
holder voting system and review the legal treatment of the problems that arise.
The pathologies of voting arise from three separate, but overlapping sources:
the multiple tiers of custody (“pathologies of complexity”); uncertainties as to
who owns a particular share (“pathologies of ownership”); and the potential
misalignment between voting rights and economic interests (“pathologies of
misalignment”).
Part IV considers a variety of directions for reform, ranging from increased
judicial scrutiny to a fundamental redesign of the system. Although a fundamen-
tal redesign would significantly improve matters, even a major reform will not
eliminate all problems because many of the pathologies we discuss are intrinsic
to a system in which shares are widely but indirectly held and in which
thousands of votes are taken every year.
Our analysis poses challenges for proponents of shareholder rights as well
as for advocates of managerialism. The inescapable complexity combined with
the already well-studied issues of shareholders’ rational apathy and free rider
problems detract from the case for shareholder voting. To what extent should
we put matters to a shareholder vote if we cannot trust in the outcome? By
the same token, however, the legitimacy of the exercise of governance powers
by the board of directors, and by management appointed by the board, rests on
the fact that directors have been elected by shareholders. If board elections
either take the form of Soviet-style votes—with one candidate per open seat
who is elected with a huge margin—or of contested elections with a close
outcome, why is it that management should call the shots?13
I. CORPORATE VOTING LAW: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
In this Part, we briefly review the legal structure of corporate voting, as a
preliminary to describing the existing voting system. We leave the gory details
of the structure to later when we discuss specific duties and examine a variety of
voting pathologies.
13. For a very recent set of materials relating to the proxy voting process and its infirmities, see
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Briefing Paper: Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, http://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter SEC, Briefing
Paper].
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A. WHEN DO SHAREHOLDERS VOTE?
Shareholders vote in a variety of circumstances, most set by Delaware law,
some by tax law, and some by stock-exchange rules. Under Delaware law,
shareholders elect the board of directors.14 While a director is generally elected
by a plurality of the votes cast,15 many companies have recently opted to
require the vote of a majority of the shares cast.16 For matters other than the
election of directors—such as bylaw amendments17 or precatory shareholder
resolutions—the basic decision rule is the affirmative vote of a majority of
shares present.18 Mergers, a sale of all or substantially all the assets, and
amendments to the certificate of incorporation, however, require the approval of
a majority of the shares entitled to vote.19 Finally, Delaware case law, while not
requiring shareholder approval of self-dealing transactions or executive compen-
sation, provides a variety of inducements for it.20
Under New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules, shareholder approval is also
required if a transaction involves the issuance of stock that increases the number
of outstanding shares (or voting power) by 20% or more.21 In addition, NYSE
listing requirements and the federal tax code encourage shareholder votes on
executive compensation. Under I.R.C. § 162(m), for an incentive-compensation
plan to qualify for optimal tax treatment, it must be approved by the sharehold-
ers.22 Similarly, and without regard to tax treatment, the NYSE Listing Require-
ments require that equity-compensation plans be approved by the shareholders
of listed companies.23
B. WHO GETS TO VOTE?
With annual turnover of shares in a public company around 99%, the
shareholder base is constantly in flux.24 It is thus necessary to define both a date
14. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §211(b) (2001); id. § 216 (Supp. 2006).
15. Id. § 216(3).
16. Delaware permits companies, for these and other matters, to adopt a higher approval threshold
than the one provided by Delaware law. See id. § 216. Note that Delaware recently made changes to its
statute regarding director elections. See id. § 141(b) (Supp. 2006) (“A resignation which is conditioned
upon the director failing to receive a specified vote for reelection as a director may provide that it is
irrevocable.”); id. § 216 (“A bylaw amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that
shall be necessary for the election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of
directors.”).
17. Id. § 109 (2001).
18. Id. § 216(2).
19. Id. § 251(c) (2001 & Supp. 2006) (mergers); id. § 271 (sale of all or substantially all assets); id.
§ 242(b) (2001) (charter amendments).
20. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116–17 (Del. 1994).
21. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 312.03(c) (2007).
22. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2000).
23. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.08 (2004); id. § 312.03(a) (2007).
24. NYSE Overview Statistics, http://www.nysedata.com/factbook (follow “NYSE Historical
Statistics” hyperlink; then follow “NYSE overview statistics” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 12,
2008).
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as of which a list of shareholders qualified to vote is determined and a mechanism for
determining the identity of the shareholder entitled to vote as of that date.
State corporate law supplies both. Under Delaware General Corporate Law
(DGCL) § 213, a “record date” is fixed in advance of any vote and “shall not be
more than 60 nor less than 10 days before the date” of the meeting.25 The
persons who, as of the record date, are listed as registered owners of the shares
on the company’s books are entitled to notice of, and to vote at, the shareholder
meeting.26
Delaware corporate law thus puts record ownership, rather than beneficial
ownership, at the center of the system. Firms are entitled to rely on the list of
registered owners in determining who is entitled to vote.27 To be sure, record
owners may authorize others to vote in their stead by means of a proxy.28 In the
absence of a transfer by proxy, however, the record owner of the shares is
entitled to vote the shares held even when the person holds the stock in a
fiduciary capacity.29
Delaware has steadfastly refused to modify its reliance on record ownership
in the voting context. It has done this not because it is unaware of custodial-
ownership structures discussed below, but because of several concerns. First,
there is a statutory and judicial concern for definiteness which is maximized by
a system of reliance on the stock list. Whatever flaws are generated by giving
entitlements to record owners, it has the benefit that the owner is clearly
specified and known to the company.
Second, Delaware views custodial arrangements as matters solely between
shareholders and their agents, which do not involve the firm. To the extent that
things go wrong, Delaware views that as a problem for the shareholder, not for
the company. Going back at least to 1945, the Delaware Supreme Court
reasoned in Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck30 that “[t]he corporation ought not
to be involved in possible misunderstandings or clashes of opinion between the
non-registered and registered holder of shares. It may rightfully look to the
corporate books as the sole evidence of membership.”31 The law governing
25. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213 (2001).
26. Id. § 219 (2001).
27. Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 494 (Del. 1988); Schott v. Climax Molybdenum Co.,
154 A.2d 221, 224 (Del. Ch. 1959).
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(c) (2001).
29. Id. § 217(a).
30. 41 A.2d 583 (Del. 1945).
31. Id. at 589. This focus has continued. For example, in Enstar Corp. v. Senouf, 535 A.2d 1351,
1354–55 (Del. 1987), the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated this bright-line view: “In making that
choice, the burden must be upon the stockholder to obtain the advantages of record ownership. The
legal and practical effects of having one’s stock registered in street name cannot be visited upon the
issuer. The attendant risks are those of the stockholder, and where appropriate, the broker” (citing Lewis
v. Corroon & Reynolds Corp., 57 A.2d 632, 634 (Del. Ch. 1948); Nickles v. United Nuclear Corp., 192
A.2d 628 (Del. Ch. 1963)). See also Am. Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 136 A.2d 690, 693
(Del. 1957); In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 21 A.2d 697 (Del. Ch. 1941).
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appraisal rights follows a similar pattern.32
C. COUNTING THE VOTES
Once votes are cast, they are counted to determine whether the required
threshold has been reached. This is complicated slightly, but only slightly, by
proxy voting. Again, the statute anticipates proxy voting: “Each stockholder
entitled to vote at a meeting of stockholders . . . may authorize another person
or persons to act for such stockholder by proxy . . . .”33 Where more than one
32. With regard to appraisal rights, title 8, section 262(a) of the Delaware Code explicitly defines a
stockholder entitled to appraisal as “a holder of record of stock in a stock corporation,” thus making
record ownership the key measure. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2001). Accordingly, an appraisal
action can only be brought by or on behalf of the record owner. Enstar Corp., 535 A.2d at 1356; Carl
M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 222 A.2d 789, 792 (Del. 1966); Olivetti Underwood
Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co., 217 A.2d 683, 686 (Del. 1966); Coyne v. Schenley Indus., 155 A.2d 238,
240 (Del. 1959); Raynor v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 331 A.2d 393, 394 (Del. Ch. 1975); In re Gen. Realty
Utils. Corp., 42 A.2d 24, 25 (Del. Ch. 1945); see also R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN,
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 9.43[B] and 44[F] (2007); RODMAN
WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 262.5 (15th ed. 2006 & Supp.
Dec. 2007). This can work to the benefit of beneficial owners. In a recent case, In re Appraisal of
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., the Delaware Chancery Court permitted hedge funds, which had
acquired shares post record date, to pursue appraisal in reliance on the fact that the record holder (Cede
& Co.) had a sufficient number of shares that had not been voted for the merger, without establishing
that the shares that the hedge funds had acquired were themselves among the shares that qualified for
appraisal. No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). The Chancellor quite
explicitly noted that the effect of the ruling would be to allow arbitrageurs to “buy into appraisal suits
by free-riding on Cede’s votes on behalf of other beneficial holders,” id. at *5, but held that the statute’s
focus on record holders dictated the outcome: “Only the record holder possesses and may perfect
appraisal rights. The statute simply does not allow consideration of the beneficial owner in this
context.” Id.
By contrast, the courts show more flexibility in other contexts. With regard to acting by consent
under DGCL § 228, “[g]enerally[] only persons whose names appear on the stock ledger as stockhold-
ers or hold proxies from record holders are qualified to execute a written consent.” WARD, supra,
§ 228.4 (also citing cases). On the other hand, Delaware courts have held that beneficial owners may
execute the consent so long as they indicate who the record holder is and have the right to vote the
shares. Olson v. Buffington, No. 8042, 1985 WL 11575, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1985). In the case of
shareholder derivative suits, an equitable remedy, the Delaware statute does not specify whether record
ownership is required and the courts have not generally required it. See, e.g., Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. v.
Saks, 122 A.2d 120 (Del. 1956); Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 1948);
BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra, § 13.10 (“An equitable owner of shares is considered a stockholder and
may maintain a derivative action.”) In litigation under DGCL § 225 (Contested Election of Directors;
Proceedings to Determine Validity), both record holders and beneficial holders may bring suit.
Rosenfield v. Standard Elec. Equip. Corp., 83 A.2d 843, 845 (Del. Ch. 1951).
Federal securities law is even less focused on record ownership. With regard to shareholder
proposals, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules provide that, in order for a shareholder
holding in nominee name to put a proposal on the issuer’s proxy statement, it must prove its eligibility
either by submitting a written statement from the record holder verifying that the proponent, at the time
the proposal was submitted, had held continuously for at least one year or, if it has filed 13Ds, 13Gs, or
other SEC reports indicating ownership, by means of those filings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007). Under
sections 10(b) and 16(b), suit can typically be brought by either the beneficial or record owner.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10(b), 16(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78p (2000); Blau v. Lamb, 314
F.2d 618, 620 (2d Cir. 1963).
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b) (2001).
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valid proxy is given for a share, the later proxy revokes the earlier proxy.
Determining the validity of proxies and the tally of votes is the responsibility of
the inspector, appointed by the corporation.34
D. RESOLVING CLOSE CONTESTS UNDER CURRENT DELAWARE LAW
Not surprisingly, Delaware has encountered close contests. In resolving
controversies, Delaware has adopted a formalistic approach that promotes
certainty and speed over accuracy and perfection.35
In contested votes, an independent inspector is appointed by the company.36
The inspector’s role is “ministerial,” not “judicial.”37 That is, the inspector is
expected to examine the proxies, determine if they meet the formal criteria, and
report the tally, but the inspector is not to resolve any disputed issues. Those are
to be recorded and, if the outcome is challenged, resolved by the court. The
report of the inspector is presumed to be correct.38
Under section 231(d), the inspector is limited in the materials he may use in
determining the validity of proxies to “the proxies, any envelopes submitted
with those proxies, any information provided in accordance with § 211(e)
[electronic transmission] or § 212(c)(2) [electronic transmission] of this title, or
any information provided pursuant to § 211(a)(2)(B)(i) or (iii) of this title
[remote communication at meetings], ballots and the regular books and records
of the corporation.”39 This part of section 231(d) largely codifies longstanding
Delaware practice.40 In addition, the inspector may consider other reliable informa-
tion, but only for “reconciling proxies and ballots submitted by or on behalf of banks,
brokers, their nominees or similar persons which represent more votes than the holder
of a proxy is authorized by the record owner to cast or more votes than the
stockholder holds of record.”41 This exception recognizes that the realities of custodial
ownership increase the likelihood of clerical and other errors and grants inspectors
some latitude in resolving overvotes. But even this latitude is constrained. In Seidman
34. Id. § 231.
35. See id. § 225 (providing the statutory basis for judicial review of contests).
36. BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.1.
37. Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 491 (Del. 1989).
38. Id.
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 231(d) (2001). Of the sections referred to, § 211(e) permits electronic
voting, § 212(c)(2) permits electronic transmission of proxies, and § 211(a)(2)(b)(i) permits participa-
tion by remote communication. These provisions were added in 2000.
40. 67 Del. Laws 810 (1990), cited in Seidman & Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.A. Fin., Inc., 837 A.2d 21,
27 n.14 (Del. Ch. 2003).
41. § 231(d) (emphasis added). Up until 1990, Delaware took an even narrower view on what
materials may be considered. Under the doctrine of Williams v. Sterling Oil of Okla., 273 A.2d 264,
265–66 (Del. 1971), the inspector could not look to any extrinsic evidence at all. In 1989, in Concord
Fin. Group v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co. of Del., 567 A.2d 1, 13 (Del. Ch. 1989), the Delaware
Chancery Court reaffirmed the Williams court’s refusal to consider extrinsic evidence and held that the
inspector erred in considering extrinsic evidence of an obvious clerical error to resolve an outcome-
determinative overvote. In response, in 1990, the Delaware legislature amended § 231 to provide the
exception discussed in text. See 67 Del. Laws 810 (1990).
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& Associates v. G.A. Financial,42 the court invalidated proxies for 233,376 shares
because the inspector was not able to obtain reliable information from the proxy clerk
to resolve an overvote of 824 shares.43
E. VOTING BY REGISTERED OWNERS: THE DELAWARE PARADIGM
The Delaware voting paradigm described in the previous sections is, thus,
straightforward. The corporation sends out proxy cards, a proxy statement, and
the annual report to its registered owners. The registered owners execute the
proxy to indicate how they wish to vote their shares (never mind how they
decide that). The proxies are then returned to a tabulator who, after checking
their formal validity (but not, for example, whether they reflect the voting
instructions of beneficial owners) and comparing them to the share register,
reports the outcome to the board of directors. Figure 1 outlines this process.
The only problem with this paradigm is that it is totally unreal: it willfully
ignores how shares are actually held and voted.
II. CUSTODIAL OWNERSHIP: HOW SHARES ARE HELD, TRANSFERRED, AND VOTED IN
THE PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATION
The implicit model of corporate voting that emerges from the Delaware
statute assumes, as in a typical close corporation, that shareholders hold shares
directly. This, of course, is not what happens in publicly held corporations, in
which around 70–80% of the shares are held by nominees.44
42. 837 A.2d 21 (Del. Ch. 2003).
43. Id. at 24, 28.
44. Exchange Act Release No. 38,406, 64 SEC Docket 231, at n.5 (Mar. 14, 1997).
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A. SHARES HELD IN “STREET NAME”
During 2006, the NYSE reported average daily volume of approximately 2
billion shares, in approximately 5 million separate trades, with a dollar volume
of around $86 billion.45 With volume of this magnitude, the “old fashioned”
system—in which shareholders held share certificates that were registered with
the issuer and transferred by the transfer agent upon delivery of the certificate
after a sale—is unworkable.46
Indeed, forty years ago, the “paperwork crunch” of certificated shares caused
the system to crash.47 In response, the United States adopted a policy of
“immobilization” of share certificates through a depository system.48 Since
then, it has become United States government policy to encourage custodial
ownership to facilitate clearing and settlement of securities trades.49 By now,
most shares of publicly held corporations are held in “street name” through
custodians such as banks and brokerage firms, with the custodians, in turn,
holding the shares through accounts at Depository Trust Company (DTC), a
depository institution and the record owner registered on the books of the
45. Calculated from the NYSE Fact Book, http://www.nysedata.com/factbook (follow “Market
Activity” hyperlink; then follow “Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE Listed” hyperlink) (last visited
Nov. 9, 2007).
46. For a discussion of why investors prefer to hold shares in street name, see John C. Wilcox, John
J. Purcell III & Hye-Won Choi, “Street Name” Registration & the Proxy Solicitation Process, in A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES 12-1, 12-3 to 12-4 (Amy L. Goodman &
John F. Olsen eds., 3d ed. Supp. 2006).
47. See U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory note (amended 2003).
48. As described in the prefatory note to Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article 8:
Transfer of securities in the traditional certificate-based system was a complicated, labor-
intensive process. Each time securities were traded, the physical certificates had to be
delivered from the seller to the buyer, and in the case of registered securities the certificates
had to be surrendered to the issuer or its transfer agent for registration of transfer. As is well
known, the mechanical problems of processing the paperwork for securities transfers reached
crisis proportions in the late 1960s, leading to calls for the elimination of the physical
certificate and development of modern electronic systems for recording ownership of securi-
ties and transfers of ownership.
Id.
49. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE PRACTICE OF RECORDING THE OWNERSHIP OF
SECURITIES IN THE RECORDS OF THE ISSUER IN OTHER THAN THE NAME OF THE BENEFICIAL OWNER OF SUCH
SECURITIES 9 (1976), microformed on CIS No. 76-H502-1 (Cong. Info. Serv.). The SEC’s final report
states:
In Section 17A of the Act Congress directed the Commission to facilitate the establishment of
a national system for the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transac-
tions. The Commission believes that the practice of registering securities in other than the
name of the beneficial owner is essential at this time to the establishment and refinement of
such a system and is consistent with the purposes of the Act, with particular reference to
Section 17A.
Id. at 10; see also Concept Release: Securities Transactions Settlement, Securities Act Release No.
8398, Exchange Act Release No. 49,405, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,384, 82 SEC
Docket 1198 (Mar. 11, 2004).
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company.50 Without such a system of custodial ownership, implementing a
system to settle securities within five business days (T5), much less today’s
norm of T3 or the current goals of T1 or T0, would simply be
impossible.
Because there are important differences between bank and brokerage
custodians, we will discuss them separately. Figure 2 provides an over-
view of a hypothetical situation in which JP Morgan and its customers
hold 450,000 shares and Morgan Stanley and its customers hold 530,000
shares.
1. Bank Custodians
Bank custodians mostly hold shares for mutual funds, pension funds, insur-
ance companies, endowments, and trusts. The leading custodian banks are Bank
of NY Mellon, JP Morgan, State Street, and Citigroup which, collectively, hold
about $30 trillion in assets.51
50. U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory note (amended 2003). Although there were once other depositories, DTC
is now the sole U.S. depository institution.
51. Globalcustody.net Asset Tables, http://www.globalcustody.net/us/custody_assets_domestic/ (last
visited Nov. 8, 2007).
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The bank custodians are, in turn, participating members of DTC, which holds
the actual shares. The DTC account holds all the bank’s shares in fungible bulk,
without any subdivision into separate accounts of the custodian’s customers.
Only the bank custodian’s records indicate how many shares are held in which
accounts and who has voting and trading authority. Often an institutional
investor will allocate money to various asset managers—some with only trading
authority, and others with both trading and voting authority. The allocation of
voting and trading authority is a matter of contract between the investor, the
asset manager, and the custodian.
Because custodial services is a specialized and highly competitive function,
many small banks that take custody of assets will deposit those assets with
another, larger, specialized bank custodian.52 This “piggybacking” can involve
three or four tiers.53 These “respondent” banks keep track of their own customer
accounts, with the larger bank simply recording on its records how many shares
it is holding for the respondent bank.54
Bank custodians provide a variety of services to their customers, including
asset safekeeping, trade processing and settlement. When, for example, an
account holder sells shares, the custodian bank will process and clear the trade.
When the trade clears, DTC will shift shares by book entry from the selling
custodian bank’s account to the acquiring custodian’s account.
Custodian banks also provide securities lending services. With their enor-
mous holdings, the custodian banks are well positioned to offer this service.
When a custodian bank “lends” out shares, a notation is typically made in the
account of the customer whose shares have been lent.55 If this is done, then the
loan will be transparent to customers when they check online or receive
monthly statements. The allocation of the fees generated by securities lending
between the custodian and the customer is a matter of negotiation, and the
amounts involved can be substantial. According to a 2001 estimate, beneficial
owners earn about $5 billion a year in fees from securities lending.56 For the
year ending March 31, 2006, CalPERS alone made $129.4 million on its
securities lending business.57
2. Broker Custodians
Brokers also act as custodians for their customers. Like bank custodians,
52. See Wilcox et al., supra note 46, at 12-9 n.24.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 12-9.
55. As will be discussed below, a securities loan is not really a loan but is a sale coupled with an
obligation to return fungible shares.
56. Mark Faulkner, Pension Funds: Lending Message Fails To Get Through, EUROMONEY INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 2001.
57. Press Release, Cal. Office of Pub. Affairs, CalPERS Approves Investment Contracts—Asset
Allocation, Supplemental Savings, Securities Lending (June 19, 2006), available at http://www.calpers.
ca.gov/index.jsp?bc/about/press/pr-2006/june/approves-investment-contracts.xml (last visited Nov. 8,
2007) [hereinafter CalPERS].
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brokers will have accounts at DTC where their shares are held in fungible
bulk.
Among broker customers, one can distinguish between the large customers
such as hedge funds and smaller retail customers. The hedge funds, and other
very large customers, will receive “prime brokerage” services, which provide a
variety of services, including share borrowing and financing of trades.
Some individual customers hold their shares in margin accounts, which allow
them to borrow against the shares and to receive a variety of services. As a
matter of contract, the shares held in a margin account are generally available to
be lent out by the broker.58 Brokers do not typically identify or attribute the
shares lent to specific margin accounts,59 and the broker retains all the proceeds
from the lending, whether or not any margin debt is outstanding.60 When shares
are held in regular, non-margin accounts, the broker typically may not lend out
the shares without permission of the account holder.
B. WHO OWNS SHARES HELD IN STREET NAME?:
AN INTRODUCTION TO U.C.C. ARTICLE 8
In corporate law, we have a conception of who the shareholder is (the
beneficial owner), and what the shareholder has (a right to vote, a right to seek
appraisal, a right to sue, a right to dividends, a right to sell, etc.). Much of
corporate law thinking and scholarship in the academy, the courts, the legisla-
tures, agencies, newspapers, and elsewhere, proceeds from some version of this
“beneficial-owner-as-shareholder paradigm.”
Earlier, we showed that under the Delaware law of corporate voting, the
58. Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Sec. Indus. Ass’n Senior Vice-President and General Counsel,
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 24, 2005), available at http://www.sifma.org/
regulatory/comment_letters/comment_letter_archives/7798.pdf.
59. See SEC, Briefing Paper, supra note 13.
60. See, e.g., Charles Schwab, Margin Application Agreement para. 8, http://www.schwab.com/cms/
P-221808.14/COM25298-01-WB.pdf?cmsidP-221808&refidP [hereinafter Schwab Margin Agree-
ment]. The Charles Schwab Margin Application’s loan consent provision states:
You agree that Securities and Other Property held in your margin account, now or in the
future, may be borrowed (either separately or together with the property of others) by us
(acting as principal) or by others. You agree that Schwab may receive and retain certain
benefits (including, but not limited to, interest on collateral posted for such loans) to which
you will not be entitled. You acknowledge that in certain circumstances, such borrowings
could limit your ability to exercise voting rights or receive dividends, in whole or in part, with
respect to the Securities and Other Property lent. You understand that for Securities and Other
Property that are lent by Schwab, the dividends paid on such Securities and Other Property
will go to the borrower. No compensation or other reimbursements will be due to you in
connection with such borrowings. However, if you are allocated a substitute payment in lieu
of dividends, you understand that such a payment may not be entitled to the same tax
treatment as may have been applied to the receipt of a dividend. You agree that Schwab is not
required to compensate you for any differential tax treatment between dividends and payments
in lieu of dividends. Schwab may allocate payments in lieu of dividends by any mechanism
permitted by law, including by using a lottery allocation system.
Id.
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beneficial owner is not exactly treated like the “shareholder” of this paradigm.
In this section, we turn to the structure of property rights under Article 8 and
show that it, too, substantially diverges from the beneficial-owner-as-share-
holder paradigm. Understanding both the legal structure of corporate voting and
the legal structure of share ownership is necessary in order to comprehend the
pathologies we discuss below and the potential solutions.
The vast volume of securities trading has led to a transformation of the
structure and content of property law as it applies to securities. Since 1973,
there has been a concerted effort to change property law in order to minimize
the number and impact of failed trades. Article 8 of the U.C.C. establishes a
property rights regime for securities that is designed for modern, indirect
shareholding. See Figure 3. Under Article 8, the beneficial owner of the shares
held in a custodial account with an intermediary (such as a broker) is considered
to be the holder of a “securities entitlement”61 in a “financial asset”62 which is
61. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(7) (amended 2003) (“‘Entitlement holder’ means a person identified in the
records of a securities intermediary as the person having a security entitlement against the securities
intermediary. If a person acquires a security entitlement by virtue of Section 8-501(b)(2) or (3), that
person is the entitlement holder.”).
62. “Financial assets” include shares. Id. § 8-102(a)(9).
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ultimately held by a depositary.63 A customer becomes an entitlement holder as
soon as the intermediary makes a book entry indicating that the customer has
bought shares.64 One important effect of this structure is that a brokerage
customer can become an entitlement holder even if the broker has not, in fact,
acquired the shares credited to the customer’s account, and even if the broker
does not own a single share of the security.
Article 8 then defines the nature of the “property interests” created and the
priority of claims on financial assets held by securities intermediaries. Section
8-503 makes clear that the interest of the customers who hold a certain security
is not an interest in any particular item of property, but rather is a pro rata
interest in all like securities of the intermediary held in common by all other
customers who own the same security.65 As a “securities entitlement holder,”
the customer has a superior claim in the securities against general creditors of
the securities intermediary. Its claim, however, is inferior vis-à-vis a purchaser
of that security from that intermediary and any creditor of the intermediary who
has obtained a security interest.66
The U.C.C., unlike the Delaware voting paradigm, thus explicitly takes
account of the modern system of custodial ownership. But, by adapting to the
63. Id. § 8-501(b)(1).
64. Id. § 8-501(c).
65. Id. § 8-503(c)–(e). Moreover, in order to prevent the shortfall of an intermediary’s securities
holdings from leading to the failure of securities trades—the minimization of such failures being the
paramount goal of Article 8—section 8-503(c) to (e) sharply limits the methods by which an entitle-
ment holder may enforce its rights. These sections provide:
(c) An entitlement holder’s property interest with respect to a particular financial asset
under subsection (a) may be enforced against the securities intermediary only by exercise of
the entitlement holder’s rights under Sections 8-505 through 8-508.
(d) An entitlement holder’s property interest with respect to a particular financial asset
under subsection (a) may be enforced against a purchaser of the financial asset or interest
therein only if:
(1) insolvency proceedings have been initiated by or against the securities intermediary;
(2) the securities intermediary does not have sufficient interests in the financial asset to satisfy
the security entitlements of all of its entitlement holders to that financial asset;
(3) the securities intermediary violated its obligations under Section 8-504 by transferring the
financial asset or interest therein to the purchaser; and
(4) the purchaser is not protected under subsection (e).
The trustee or other liquidator, acting on behalf of all entitlement holders having security
entitlements with respect to a particular financial asset, may recover the financial asset, or
interest therein, from the purchaser. If the trustee or other liquidator elects not to pursue that
right, an entitlement holder whose security entitlement remains unsatisfied has the right to
recover its interest in the financial asset from the purchaser.
(e) An action based on the entitlement holder’s property interest with respect to a particular
financial asset under subsection (a), whether framed in conversion, replevin, constructive
trust, equitable lien, or other theory, may not be asserted against any purchaser of a financial
asset or interest therein who gives value, obtains control, and does not act in collusion with the
securities intermediary in violating the securities intermediary’s obligations under Section
8-504.
Id.
66. Id. § 8-511 (amended 2003).
1242 [Vol. 96:1227THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
complexities created by custodial ownership, it loses determinacy with respect
to the key shareholder rights in corporate law. While the informal corporate law
paradigm views the shareholder as the owner of a thing—a share—the U.C.C.
has customers who jointly own an interest in a fungible mass, with no specific
shares attributed to any specific customer. The misalignment between the
property rights implicit in the beneficial-owner-as-shareholder paradigm and the
property concepts from Article 8 comes to the fore in the problem of overvot-
ing.
C. HOW NOMINEE SHARES ARE VOTED
That shares are held in street name greatly complicates the voting process.
Before votes can be tabulated, one must identify and locate the beneficial
owners, distribute proxy materials to them, and collect their votes. In this
section, we discuss these steps in greater detail.
1. Step 1: Finding the Beneficial Owners
To find the beneficial owner, the issuer sends an inquiry to DTC in which it
asks for a list of participant custodians who hold shares of the issuer in its
account (Figure 4). Depositories are obligated to identify participants promptly
and to indicate the number of shares owned by each as of the date of the
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inquiry.67 If there is a discrepancy between the number of shares held by
DTC as indicated by the corporation’s share register and the number as it
appears on DTC’s records, such discrepancies are not typically reconciled at
this stage.68
After receiving information from DTC, the issuer will send a “search card” to
all bank and broker nominee holders in which it asks for the number of proxies
and other materials needed (Figure 5a).69 Upon receipt of the search card, banks
and brokers must provide the information requested (Figure 5b). Most custodi-
ans delegate the task of processing proxies and other corporate communications
to Broadridge (known as ADP Shareholder Services until its recent spinoff), the
dominant provider of proxy services. Broadridge then provides this information
to the issuer.70
Custodians operate on a tight schedule. Brokers must respond to search-card
inquiries within seven business days of receipt.71 Banks must identify all
respondent banks within one business day of receipt of the search card.72 They
then have seven business days to indicate the approximate number of beneficial
owners holding the issuer’s shares directly with that bank (in other words, not
counting respondent banks).73 When the issuer receives the initial response
from banks identifying respondent banks, it sends search cards to the respon-
dent banks, and the process is then repeated for subsequent layers until the
lowest tier of respondent bank has provided the issuer with the number of its
customers holding stock of the issuer.
Part of this complexity is due to the fact that issuers do not know with
precision who their shareholders are. Under the NOBO/OBO system, the banks
and brokers must provide the identity of the account holders to the issuer unless
an account holder has affirmatively opted to be an “objecting beneficial owner”
(OBO).74 Approximately 75% of beneficial owners object to disclosure of their
names, with the result that roughly 52–60% of the shares of public companies
are held by OBOs.75 Issuers, thus, cannot communicate directly with this large
67. Exchange Act Rule 17Ad-8(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad-8(a) (2007). Depositories can charge for
the cost of compliance. § 240.17Ad-8(b).
68. Letter from John C. Wilcox, Vice Chairman, Georgeson S’holder Commc’ns Inc., to the Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/
georgeson121203.htm.
69. This is required under Exchange Act Rule 14a-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13 (2007).
70. See Chris Kentouris, Swingvote Morphs into Full-Service Proxy Provider, SEC. INDUS. NEWS,
Nov. 13, 2006, at 12; see also Broadridge Fin. Solutions, L.L.C., Amendment to Registration of
Securities (Amend. 4 to Form 10), at 3, 65 (Mar. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Broadridge, Amend. 4 to Form
10].
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1(b)(1) (2007).
72. Id. § 240.14b-2(b)(1)(i).
73. Id. § 240.14b-1(b)(1)(i).
74. See id. § 240.14b-1(b)(3) (brokers); id. § 240.14b-2(b)(4)(ii)(B) (banks).
75. Bus. Roundtable, Request for Rulemaking Concerning Shareholder Communications, Petition
4-493, Apr. 12, 2004, at n.2, http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-493.htm (based on information
from Automatic Data Processing, Inc.) [hereinafter Bus. Roundtable Petition].
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segment of shareholders. Broadridge, however, as an agent of the custodians,
has access to this information even for OBOs and thus plays the critical role of
distributing the proxy materials.
2. Step 2: Distributing the Material, Soliciting the Vote
Once the issuer has identified its beneficial owners, it must provide each
custodian with sufficient copies of the proxy packet (proxy cards, annual report,
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and proxy statement).76 Upon receipt of the materials, custodians have five
business days to forward them to beneficial owners.77 Typically, Broadridge
performs all of these tasks as an agent for the custodians. See Figure 6. The
issuer is also required to pay the costs of this distribution.78 The NYSE and
NASD have rules setting the charges that Broadridge, acting on behalf of
brokers, may charge listed firms.79 Banks, with no similar organization to set
rates, typically follow the NYSE rates.80
The “notice and access” model of delivery of proxy material, which arrived
on July 1, 2007, may change things dramatically. The SEC’s recent amendments
to the proxy rules permit public companies to furnish proxy materials to
shareholders by posting them on a website and providing the shareholders with
notice of the internet availability of the materials.81 If shareholders have previ-
ously elected to receive proxy materials by electronic delivery, this notice will
be sent by email. If not, it will be sent by regular mail. Shareholders will then
have the option to request paper copies of the proxy materials. When a company
chooses to use “notice and access,” custodians will have to send their own
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1.
77. Id. § 240.14b-1(b)(2); id. § 240.14b-2(b)(3).
78. Id. § 240.14a-13(a)(5).
79. NYSE, Inc., Rule 465 Supplementary Material, available at http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/
Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNodechp_1_2&manual/nyse/nyse_rules/nyse-rules/; NASD, Inc., Rule
2260 Interpretive Material, available at http://finra.complinet.com/finra/display/display.html?rbid
1189&element_id1159000466.
80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-2(c)(3).
81. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 55, 146, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 27,671, 72 Fed. Reg. 4138 (proposed Jan. 29, 2007).
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notices to their customers, the beneficial owners, and a beneficial owner may
then request written materials. This new model, like many other aspects of the
internet, creates a great deal of uncertainty over what the system will look like
going forward.82
3. Step 3: Voting
At the beginning of the process, DTC executes an omnibus proxy in favor
of its participant firms. In the case of bank custodians, the custodian will
execute an omnibus proxy in favor of the respondent banks who, in turn, will
execute omnibus proxies in favor of their (second tier) respondents, and so
forth.83
To enable the ultimate beneficial owners to vote, banks and brokers must
provide them either with an executed proxy card or a request for voting
instructions.84 They typically do the latter. Broadridge is again the key player at
this stage. When everything works perfectly, Broadridge receives voting instruc-
tions, verifies receipt, verifies that the signatories have voting authority, ex-
ecutes the proxy on behalf of its custodian (bank or broker) principal aggregating
the instructions it has received, and then forwards the proxies to the “tabulator.”
See Figure 7.
4. Step 4: Tabulation
The final step in the process is the tabulation of the votes. The tabulator is
charged with the task of checking the validity of proxies received—many of
82. See, e.g., Broadridge, Amend. 4 to Form 10, supra note 70, at 11. Broadridge’s registration
statement describes how the new model may affect its business:
The adopted changes, and the proposed changes, if adopted, will have a significant effect on
our business. For those companies that choose the notice and access option, we will continue
to mail notices to those stockholders who have not elected to receive proxy materials
electronically. Therefore, the volume of items to be mailed will most likely remain unchanged.
However, the weight of the packages will be less, resulting in lower revenues per distribution.
At the same time, some stockholders may elect to continue to receive paper copies of proxy
materials. Certain of these mailings may not receive the benefit of volume discounts, resulting
in higher revenues per distribution. We also anticipate deriving additional revenue from the
fulfillment services that we expect to provide for individually ordered paper proxy materials
and for the establishment of procedures such as toll-free numbers and websites to accommo-
date the requests of stockholders to receive paper proxy materials for up to one year after the
conclusion of the meeting or corporate action to which the materials relate. Additionally, we
may derive revenue from new services such as the creation of access notices and the creation
and maintenance of a new database of stockholders requesting paper proxy materials. We do
not at this time know how many companies will choose the notice and access option, nor do
we know how many stockholders will elect to continue to receive paper copies of proxy
materials. As a result, we cannot at this time predict the net effect of the SEC’s new electronic
access rules on our Investor Communication Solutions business.
Id.
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-2(b)(2)(i).
84. Id. § 240.14b-1(b)(2) (for brokers); id. §240.14b-2(b)(3) (for banks); see BALOTTI ET AL., supra
note 2, § 10.7; Wilcox et al., supra note 46, at 12-8 to 12-10.
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which will have been executed by Broadridge—and checking to make sure
that the number of nominee shares voted equals the number of shares that
DTC indicates are held in nominee name. The issuer retains the tabulator
which is often the issuer’s transfer agent.85 More recently, Broadridge has
also been expanding into this business.86 In contested votes, an independent
inspector is often retained to count the proxies. IVS Associates is the leading
firm.87
III. PATHOLOGIES OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING: WHAT CAN AND DOES GO WRONG
A comparison of Figures 1 and 7 shows the source of the problems that we
discuss below. The complexity of the custodial ownership system, combined
with the pressure of numerous shareholder votes, creates a system that is far
more complex and fragile than the one anticipated by the Delaware legal
85. See, e.g., Am. Stock Transfer & Trust Co., Shareholder Services, http://www.amstock.com/
corporate/corporate_proxy.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
86. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., ADP Announces Voting Confirmation Program for 2007
Proxy Season, http://www.investquest.com/iq/a/adp/ne/news/bs/adp011707.htm (last visited
Dec. 30, 2007).
87. IVS Assocs., Inc., An Industry Leader in Independent Ballot Tabulation Services, http://
www.ivsassociates.com/html/index2.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
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structure. There are somewhere around 17,000 reporting companies.88 Most of
these companies are subject to the SEC proxy rules when they solicit proxies.89
Finally, annual meetings are seasonal, with most taking place during the second
quarter of the calendar year.90 Broadridge delivers more than one billion
communications to investors per year.91 It is an accident waiting to happen.
An aggravating factor is that, for both issuers and custodians, the voting
process is a necessary chore, not a profit center. The issuers must solicit
proxies because they need a quorum to act. Federal law requires custodians to
assist in the identification of beneficial owners, distribution of materials, and
collection of proxies. Custodians typically delegate that task to Broadridge,
which is in the happy position of being hired by the custodians but presenting its bill
to the issuers.
This system produces three types of pathologies. First, there are pathologies
caused by the sheer complexity of the system. Second, there are pathologies
caused by a misalignment of the property concepts implicit in the beneficial-
owner-as-shareholder paradigm and the property rules that, in fact, govern the
ownership of shares held by nominees. Third, there are pathologies caused by a
misalignment between voting rights and economic interests.
A. PATHOLOGIES OF COMPLEXITY
1. Pathology 1: Materials Don’t Arrive
The corporate voting system operates on a tight schedule. As noted earlier,
the record date, under Delaware law, cannot be more than sixty days before the
meeting. For shares held in nominee name, the following steps must occur
before the materials are mailed out: the issuer sends an inquiry to DTC; DTC
responds; the issuer sends out search cards to the custodians; the custodians
respond; often this process has to be repeated for multiple tiers of custodians;
then, and only then, can the issuer mail the materials to Broadridge, which then
distributes them to the shareholders. Given this complexity, there will be
numerous cases in which the proxy materials and the request for voting instruc-
tions simply do not make it to the beneficial owner in time for the beneficial
owner to vote.
Why does it matter if materials do not arrive? Most obviously, it deprives the
88. There is no official figure of the number of public companies in the U.S., and estimates vary. For
one estimate, see Thomas J. Donohue, President & CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Remarks at the
Three Sector Summit––Hitachi Found. (July 14, 2003), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/
speeches/2003/030714tjd_hitachi.htm.
89. Some companies are reporting companies under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2000), without also being registered under section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2000), such
as privately held companies with public debt. Id. §§ 78l, 78o(d). Those companies are subject to part of
the mandatory disclosure system (for example, Rule 15d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-1 (2007), requires that
annual reports be filed), but are not subject to the proxy rules that only apply to companies registered
under section 12 of the Act. Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000).
90. Broadridge, Amend. 4 to Form 10, supra note 70, at 46.
91. Id. at 3.
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beneficial owners of their right to vote. Moreover, it is likely that the beneficial
owners most affected by materials not arriving are individual investors. The
failure of materials to arrive will correspondingly increase the relative influence
of the institutional shareholders.
But the effects are more complex. “Non-votes” resulting from the non-
delivery of proxy materials are, for legal purposes, treated identically with
non-votes resulting from apathy or carelessness. Under NYSE Rule 452, bro-
kers may use their discretion to vote shares on routine and uncontested matters
as to which the broker does not receive instructions ten days in advance of the
meeting.92 At least until recently, brokers have tended to vote uninstructed
shares in accordance with recommendations of the board of directors.93 Thus,
with respect to such shares, any non-arrival of materials translates into more
pro-management votes.94
Bank custodians, however, are not covered by this rule and the agreement
between the custodial bank and its customer typically does not permit banks to
vote uninstructed shares.95 Thus, with respect to shares held by banks, and for
non-routine matters also with respect to shares held by brokers, any non-arrival
of materials translates into the shares not being voted at all.
What, in turn, is the effect of a failure to vote? First, it may make it more
difficult for issuers to meet their quorum requirements.96 Second, for matters
requiring an affirmative vote by a majority of the shares entitled to vote—
such as mergers97 or charter amendments98—a failure to vote is equivalent
to a “no” vote. Since these matters are generally proposed by the board, any
92. NYSE, Inc., Rule 451 (Mar. 6, 2003); NYSE, Inc., Rule 452 (Mar. 6, 2003). Rule 452 states:
[A] member organization . . . may give or authorize the giving of a proxy to voted such stock,
provided the person in the member organization giving or authorizing the giving of the proxy
has no knowledge of any contest as to the action to be taken at the meeting and provided such
action is adequately disclosed to stockholders and does not include authorization for a merger,
consolidation or any other matter which may affect substantially the rights or privileges of
such stock.
Id. Under Rule 452.11(2), contests are defined to be matters which are “the subject of a counter-
solicitation, or [] part of a proposal made by a stockholder which is being opposed by management (i.e.,
a contest).” For more on the broker non-vote, see Wilcox et al., supra note 46, at 12-8 to 12-9.
93. Scannell, supra note 8 (“Brokers generally vote for management, partly, they say, because if
clients wanted them to oppose management they would let them know.”).
94. Note, however, that the universe of “routine” matters may soon shrink. In June 2006, a NYSE
Working Group recommended that the rule be modified to make clear that uncontested directorial
elections should no longer be deemed routine, effective 2008. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 3 (2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/
pdfs/PWG_REPORT.pdf. But, because the SEC has not yet acted, the change will not be effective for
the 2008 proxy season. See Janet L. Fisher & Mary E. Alcock, Voting at Annual Meetings, CORP.
GOVERNANCE, Nov. 2007, at 2; Elizabeth Hinck, United States: What’s New for the 2008 Proxy Season,
MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Nov. 27, 2007.
95. See Wilcox et al., supra note 46, at 12-9 to 12-10.
96. The default quorum requirement is set at 50%, but it can be lowered by a charter provision to as
little as 33.3%. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
97. Id. § 251(c).
98. Id. § 242(b).
1250 [Vol. 96:1227THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
non-arrival of materials translates into a vote against management recommenda-
tions.
Matters are even more complex where some of the items on the ballot are
routine and others are non-routine. As long as brokers continue to exercise their
authority on routine matters, the respective shares will count towards the
quorum requirements and be deemed present at the meeting, but will abstain
from casting a vote on the non-routine matters. For some purposes, such
abstentions are treated differently from a failure to send in any ballot. For
example, in uncontested director elections, an “abstention” takes the form of
“withholding” of authority to vote in favor of the nominee and is thus indistin-
guishable from a vote by a holder who is affirmatively opposed to the nomi-
nee.99 The number of votes withheld is the key indicator of shareholders’
dissatisfaction with the incumbent management. Moreover, for companies that
have adopted a “majority vote” requirement for director election, sufficient
withhold votes have the legal effect of the director not being elected or forcing
him to resign. For director elections, abstentions thus are, in effect, anti-
management votes. Shareholder proposals, similarly, require a majority of
shares voting,100 so that abstentions have a similar effect as “no” votes. But
because shareholder proposals are typically opposed by management, an absten-
tion on them is equivalent to a pro-management vote.
2. Pathology 2: Votes That Are Not Counted
Consider the following incident.101 A 9% holder received proxy materials
from Broadridge for an “uncontested” election of directors that indicated that
voting instructions had to be received by 11:59 p.m. on the day before the
annual meeting. At 11:00 p.m., to show its displeasure with current manage-
ment, the holder gave instructions that its votes should be withheld from all
nominees. When the results were announced, the company stated that 95% of
shares voted had been cast for the nominees. When the holder inquired, it
discovered that the tabulator had stopped tabulating votes at 4:00 p.m. on the
day before the meeting in order to prepare its report in a timely manner. As a
result, the holder’s votes were not included.102 When, as is apparently currently
the case, shareholders change their votes up to the last minute, the votes
99. Wilcox et al., supra note 46, at 12-11 to 12-12.
100. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
101. The following is based on a confidential personal communication with one of the authors.
102. The law governing the appointment and role of inspectors is surprisingly sparse. Title 8, section
231 of the Delaware Code requires that inspectors be appointed in advance of all meetings of publicly
held corporations and gives them the responsibility for ascertaining the number of shares outstanding,
determining the shares represented at the meeting and the validity of proxies counting votes and ballots,
and certifying their determination of the number of shares represented and the count. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 231(a)–(c) (2001). Section 231 further provides:
The date and time of the opening and the closing of the polls for each matter upon which the
stockholders will vote at a meeting shall be announced at the meeting. No ballot, proxies or
votes, nor any revocations thereof or changes thereto, shall be accepted by the inspectors after
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counted may have actually been revoked.
Early closing is only one aspect of a more-general problem of votes not being
counted. Consider a tabulation anecdote involving a routine annual meeting at
Unilever:
The agenda included no contentious issues, and there was no sign of share-
holder unrest. But executives at the Anglo-Dutch consumer products com-
pany, maker of Dove soap, Hellmann’s mayonnaise and Lipton tea, noticed
that the shareholder vote total was suspiciously low. So they called major
institutional investors and discovered that seven of them had simply not
bothered to take part, and that votes from another three had never been
delivered to Unilever because of a coding error by Institutional Shareholder
Services . . . .103
Oesterle and Palmiter recount the earlier, nightmare 1993 proxy season:
The leaky dam of proxy tabulation burst in the 1993 proxy season when
various institutional investors blew the whistle on [Broadridge], a tabulation
firm that handles over seventy percent of all corporate proxy solicitations.
Several investors claimed [Broadridge] had not tallied their proxies in a “just
vote no” campaign against Paramount Communications. The Paramount mis-
count was only the tip of the iceberg. During the solicitation period before the
1993 spring annual meetings, [Broadridge] had experienced significant difficul-
ties: Proxy materials were sent out late or not at all; [Broadridge] received
proxy tabulations late or not at all, causing several firms to struggle to meet
quorum requirements or to postpone meetings; electronic tabulation systems
failed to function; and proxy solicitors had to solicit proxies several times.104
the closing of the polls unless the Court of Chancery upon application by a stockholder shall
determine otherwise.
Id. § 231(c).
Typically, the polls are opened officially during the meeting to receive proxies and ballots (from
those shareholders present). BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 2, § 8.12. The official closing of the polls is
more complicated. “In a simple, uncontested meeting . . . , the results of any vote often may be
tabulated and announced without any adjournment of the meeting.” Id. On the other hand, when a vote
is close, the polls can be kept open while the company’s proxy solicitor works to find more votes. This
discretion likely explains Listokin’s finding that management is overwhelmingly likely to win close
contests. See Listokin, supra note 9, at 1; see also discussion supra note 9 and accompanying text. If, at
the beginning of a meeting, management is short votes, the polls can be held open while the solicitors
continue soliciting votes. The situation is more complicated when a meeting is adjourned (for example,
for thirty days) in order to allow management to round up additional votes for a specific matter. In State
of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) v. Peerless Systems Corp., the Chancery Court considered such
a situation under a Blasius analysis, No. Civ. A. 17637, 2000 WL 805376, *3–4, *7–8, *19 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 4, 2000) (discussing Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (1998)), and while not granting
summary judgment for SWIB, was extremely skeptical of whether Peerless could sustain its burden of
establishing a “compelling justification” for interfering with the shareholders’ franchise. Id.
103. Steven Brull, The Best-Laid Plans . . . , INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR AMERICAS, Feb. 2004, at 38.
104. Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79
IOWA L. REV. 485, 510–11 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
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What is the effect of the non-counting of votes? If votes are not counted by
mistake, the effect is similar to the non-arrival of materials. But even if the
tabulator stops counting early because there are already enough votes in to
determine the outcome, there may be an important, albeit symbolic, effect: the
margin of victory (in particular the percentage of withheld votes in director
elections or the percentage supporting a shareholder resolution) can be an
important indicator of the support that management enjoys.
3. Pathology 3: The Nightmare of Verification
The most troubling pathology of complexity is the system’s inability to
provide vote verification and an end-to-end audit trail. Any voting system is
only as good as its post-voting system of verification. The complex system of
holdings, combined with the circuitous system of distributing materials, solicit-
ing proxies and collecting voting instructions, creates a nightmare of verifica-
tion. The first complexity arises because shareholders may hold shares both
directly and in street name, and some shareholders, such as banks and brokers,
may hold shares directly, in street name for their own accounts, and in street
name for customer accounts. Broadridge, as the votes come in, records them
and sends a “multiple proxy” to the tabulator.105 The first multiple proxy is
typically issued fifteen days prior to the meeting with daily updates from the
ninth day.106 Banks and brokers frequently use so-called “partials”—“proxies
voting less than all of the shares they are entitled to vote.”107 These partials are
cumulative, which means that substantial care is required to prevent the custo-
dian from voting more shares than it is entitled to.108 With respect to nominee
shares, the custodians are voting on behalf of their customers who may have
differing views. The proxies will thus be split between “for,” “against,” and
“abstain.”
With this complexity, problems are common. The leading treatise on share-
holder meetings recounts the following (illustrative but hardly exhaustive)
problems:
● Because of the multiple mailings by each side and the increased pressure
placed on the brokers by proxy solicitors, there are some banks and
brokers who overvote their position. Some bank brokers [sic] will vote
all their shares for both sides; others will change their vote without
revoking previously voted shares of varying amounts.109
105. BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.7.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. § 10.8. In these cases, the inspector contacts the proxy clerk to resolve the overvote, as
permitted by title 28, section 231 of the Delaware Code. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 231 (2001).
“Some firms cooperate with the inspectors when they overvote; others refuse to change their vote,
maintaining that they hold the number of shares they voted . . . . Any broker or bank proxies that cannot
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● [B]anks sometimes combine accounts at will in voting proxies. The best
the inspectors can do is match proxies by account numbers and vote the
latest dated proxy for each account. However, banks frequently return
proxies for large numbers of shares which do not bear an account
number. Upon investigation, the inspectors are told that these proxies
are a combination of accounts which the banks can or cannot identify at
this time.110
● [In] a new practice known as piggybacking,111 . . . . [a]ll of the shares of
the small bank are given one account number by the large bank, even
though there are a number of beneficial owners represented by the small
bank. The result is that inspectors receive bank proxies with the same
account number bearing varying numbers of shares.112
Verification is made more complicated by inconsistent records. As John Wilcox
explains:
The “shareholder list” used for solicitation and tabulation of votes at share-
holder meetings is actually a compilation of public and non-public data
collected from different sources on the record date—the Depository Trust
Company (DTC) participant position listing (the Cede list), the share register
maintained by the issuer or its transfer agent, the customer account records of
banks and brokers, and the internal records of investment managers and their
agents. As these records are being assembled, no effort is made to conduct an
audit or reconcile inconsistent share positions. For example, the number of
shares on the DTC omnibus proxy invariably differs from the shares in the
Cede account on a company’s share register. No procedure is available to
reconcile the discrepancy.113
Finally, any meaningful verification efforts are hampered by the presence of two
parallel tabulation systems: one for registered holders where the inspector
matches proxies against a shareholder list and a second for voting instructions
by beneficial holders tabulated by Broadridge.114 How Broadridge and its
customers—the bank and broker custodians—adjust overvotes, revocations, and
other problems within its system is entirely opaque. Even less is known about
how often Broadridge makes clerical errors in compiling its proxy based on the
numerous voting instructions provided by beneficial holders or in verifying that
be resolved by telephone are not counted, but reported as unresolved.” BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 2,
§ 10.8.
110. BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.8.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54.
112. BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.8.
113. John C. Wilcox, Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors: Unintended Consequences
and the Case for Reform of the U.S. Proxy System, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT 6
(Lucian A. Bebchuk ed., 2004).
114. Id. at 7.
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the person giving the instructions had proper voting authority. Delaware courts’
reluctance to look beyond the tabulation system for registered owners further
complicates matters.
The verification nightmare suggests that there may well be discrepancies—
sometimes significant ones—between the ballots cast and the voting instruc-
tions given by the beneficial holders. This generates random “noise” in the
tabulation of votes, which may sometimes favor and sometimes disfavor manage-
ment, but which always makes the reported results less reliable. If one believes
not only that a decision by shareholders (when they are entitled to vote) is
important for legitimacy purposes, but also that shareholder support is related to
whether a decision is a good one, then even random noise will increase the error
rate. Worse decisions will be certified as having received the requisite share-
holder support.
B. PATHOLOGIES OF OWNERSHIP: CONFUSIONS AS TO WHO “REALLY” OWNS THE SHARES
The second set of pathologies arises because of a misalignment of the
property concepts implicit in the beneficial-owner-as-shareholder paradigm and
the property rules that, in fact, govern the voting of shares held by nominees,
combined with widespread securities lending and short selling. As we show in
this section, when this framework is combined with modern custodial practices,
there can be surprising results with unclear legal guidance.
1. Pathology 4: Securities Lending Surprise
Suppose that an institutional investor wishes to vote its shares only to
discover that they have been “lent out”? This happens. There is a story, perhaps
apocryphal,115 of a prominent institutional investor who had sponsored and
campaigned vigorously for a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8 only to
discover after the record date had passed that it had no shares to vote because it
had “lent” them out and that another institution loaned the sponsoring institu-
tion shares to prevent the proposal from being disqualified. (Alas, this story
makes no sense because the rule requires a proponent to be a shareholder and
then to hold the shares through the date of the meeting.)116
To understand this pathology, we need to discuss a bit of detail. There is an
active market for the borrowing and lending of securities. Securities lending
serves a variety of purposes, including importantly that it enables short selling.
When an investor believes that shares are over-valued and will soon decline in
price, it can profit by selling the shares now (at the high price) and then
covering the position later once the price has declined. Because “naked” short
selling is illegal,117 the investor must “borrow” shares in order to sell them now
at the high price. Later, it will buy the same shares, hopefully at a lower price,
115. Confidential Communication to author.
116. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007).
117. 17 C.F.R. § 242.203 (2007).
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and restore them to the lender.
As this example demonstrates, the terms “lending” and “borrowing” are not
accurate. The standard form contract governing equity lending prepared by the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) is a “Master
Repurchase Agreement.”118 The securities “loan” is really a transfer by a seller
(for example, an institutional investor) of full legal title in securities to a buyer
(for example, a hedge fund). In exchange, the buyer promises to sell back
equivalent (but different) shares in the future, to make the lender whole for any
dividends paid during the loan period,119 to pay a fee, and to provide collateral.
If a shareholder “lends” its shares out before the record date, the shareholder is
not a shareholder as of the record date and is not entitled to vote,120 whether or
not the “returned” shares are received prior to the meeting.121
As noted earlier, securities lending is a huge market and a highly profitable
business.122 Firms make an estimated $5 billion per year from securities lend-
ing,123 with CalPERS alone making about $130 million per year from its
operations.124 Typically, large institutional investors will either have the custo-
dian bank handle the securities lending or will put the business out to bid to a
third-party specialist. As a result, the personnel in the institutional investor with
responsibility for voting the shares may not even be aware that the shares are
out “on loan.”
Institutional investors have access to records of their securities-lending opera-
tions and can, if they choose, decline to lend out their shares or recall them in
advance of record dates for meetings at which they intend to raise issues or
want to vote. But doing so would sacrifice substantial revenue. Most securities
118. BOND MKT. ASS’N, MASTER REPURCHASE AGREEMENT (1996), available at http://archives1.sifma.org/
agrees/master_repo_agreement.pdf. Annex VIII governs the “lending” of equity securities. See BOND
MKT. ASS’N, ANNEX VIII: TRANSACTIONS IN EQUITY SECURITIES (1998), available at http://archives1.
sifma.org/agrees/equityannex.pdf [hereinafter ANNEX VIII].
119. See ANNEX VIII, supra note 118, para. 4(a).
120. With regard to ERISA fiduciaries, the Department of Labor addressed the fiduciary’s duties in a
1992 letter in which it concluded that “‘potential inability to vote on proxy proposals that may arise
while the loan is outstanding . . . should be considered by a fiduciary as part of the decision to loan
shares of stock.’” Wilcox et al., supra note 46, at 12-19 (alteration to the original in the quoted text)
(quoting Letter from Ivan L. Strasfeld to James E. Heard dated Feb. 20, 1992). Wilcox et al. report that
“[t]he DOL’s letter has been interpreted as requiring ERISA fiduciaries to have some system in place to
ensure they are in physical possession of shares on the record date for meetings at which significant
proposals are being considered.” Id.
121. Annex VIII provides: “Except as otherwise agreed by the parties, Seller waives the right to
vote, or to provide any consent or to take any similar action with respect to, Purchased Securities that
are Equity Securities in the event that the record date or deadline for such vote, consent or other action
falls during the term of a Transaction.” ANNEX VIII, supra note 118, para. 7.
122. According to a 2004 survey, the total securities lending volume with all U.S. counterparties is
estimated to be approximately $1.94 trillion. BOND MKT ASS’N, REPO & SECURITIES LENDING SURVEY OF
U.S. MARKETS VOLUME AND LOSS EXPERIENCE 3 (2005), available at http://www.sifma.net/assets/files/
repoSurvey0105.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2008). Of that, about $275 billion comes from margin
accounts. Id.
123. Faulkner, supra note 56.
124. CalPERS, supra note 57.
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lending programs combine the shares of a large number of customers. Recalls of
lent shares or freezes on lending increase the transaction costs of the entity that
handles the lending program. If a participant in a securities-lending program
regularly recalls or freezes shares in advance of a record date, that entity will
simply give preference to the many participants who do not impose such
limitations and will not lend the participant’s shares out unless no other shares
are available. The effect of such a policy would thus be to opt out of securities
lending, a very expensive decision.125
A solution is further complicated by the gap between fixing the record date
and the date on which the agenda for the meeting is announced. Suppose that
the board announces on January 20 that the record date is February 1.126 On
February 15, it announces—consistent with the bylaws which typically allow
the board to fix the date of the annual meeting—that the annual meeting will be
April 1 and only then discloses the agenda. If an institution learns at this point
that there is an item on the agenda that it wants to vote on, it will be too late to
put a freeze on lending the shares of the issuer; any shares that were lent out as
of February 1 will not be available to be voted.127
What is the effect of the securities lending surprise? For one, the lender—
although economically a beneficial owner of the shares—will not be able to
vote. Instead, as an initial matter, the borrower obtains the voting right.
When the whole transaction is done to enable a short sale, the borrower,
however, has no beneficial interest in the shares either; to the contrary, the
borrower benefits when the share price declines. But then again, if the borrower
sells the shares prior to the record date as part of the short sale, the borrower
will not have any voting rights either. In that event, voting rights are de facto
transferred from one entity with a beneficial interest—the lender—to another
entity with a beneficial interest—the person who acquires the shares from the
borrower.
So why does this matter? Much securities lending is done on behalf of
institutional investors. Recent reforms have rested on the assumption that
institutional investors are potentially more-engaged shareholders than indi-
vidual investors. Securities lending may thus result in the transfer of votes from
institutional investors to shareholders who are, on average, less engaged and in-
formed.
125. Nor can the securities lender solve the problem by retaining the vote by securing a proxy
from the record holder. The borrower may want to sell the shares prior to the record date in the
public market. Requiring the anonymous purchaser of these shares to execute a proxy is impracti-
cable.
126. Under New York Stock Exchange rules, the issuer must announce the record date ten days in
advance. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 204.21 (2006). Under title 8, section 213 of the
Delaware Code, the board of directors must fix the record date between ten and sixty days before the
meeting and not before the date of the board resolution. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213 (2001).
127. These problems, of course, can be lessened to the extent that proponents of shareholder
proposals publicize their intention to make a proposal well in advance of the meeting. In proxy
contests, however, the challengers may not want to provide that warning.
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2. Pathology 5: Overvoting when There Is Short-Selling
The “securities lending surprise” arises on the custodial bank side where the
customers maintain control over their shares but may choose to lend them out
for some extra money. On the custodial broker side, the potential mischief is
more troubling and less easily resolved. Specifically, securities lending can
result in brokers soliciting votes, and receiving instructions, for more shares
than are entitled to vote.128
As noted earlier, the standard margin-account agreement between brokers and
customers grants the broker the right to “lend” out shares in the account and to
keep the fees for doing so without notifying the customer.129 Moreover, it is also
standard practice for the broker not to identify from which accounts “lent”
shares have been taken.
These standard practices can and do cause significant problems. Consider
Figures 8 and 9. Suppose that Morgan Stanley has 1 million shares of Delaware,
Inc. in its DTC account, while Smith Barney has 500,000 shares in its account.
128. See RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL § 15.05[C] (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 1999); see also BALOTTI ET AL., supra
note 2, § 10.7; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Owner-
ship: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011 (2006) (discussing issues of
overvoting).
129. Schwab Margin Agreement, supra note 60, para. 8.
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A hedge fund customer “borrows” 100,000 shares from Morgan Stanley and, to
go short, sells them to a customer of Smith Barney. Once that sale is completed,
the DTC records will show that Smith Barney has 600,000 shares, while
Morgan Stanley now has 900,000 shares.
As illustrated in Figures 10 and 11, DTC’s omnibus proxy will transfer the
right to vote 900,000 shares to Morgan Stanley and will inform Broadridge of
this. Morgan Stanley, however, will give Broadridge a list of all its customers’
holdings in Delaware, Inc. for a total of 1 million shares. Broadridge will then
send out proxy materials according to the brokers’ customer lists, with the result
that it will solicit voting instructions for more shares than are in fact entitled to
vote.
What if Morgan Stanley customers return sufficient instructions so that
Morgan also receives voting instructions for more than 900,000 shares? Broad-
ridge clearly should only cast votes for 900,000 shares, since casting a higher
number may result in all of Morgan Stanley’s votes being invalidated.130 But
130. This happened, for example, in Seidman & Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.A. Fin., Inc., 837 A.2d 21,
24–25, 28 (Del. Ch. 2003) (invalidating proxies for 233,376 shares when unable to resolve an 824-share
overvote). When there is no reconciliation, there is no standard industry practice for what the tabulator
should do. As the NYSE pointed out: “Tabulators may respond to over-votes with a variety of
vote-counting procedures, including counting votes on a first in-first voted or last in-first voted basis, or
disregarding altogether a vote submitted by a broker dealer.” In re Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.,
NYSE Decision 05-45, para. 11 (Feb. 2, 2006).
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cutting down the number of voting instructions to the number of shares the
broker is entitled to vote means that someone (who?) must decide whose votes
count.131
Current practice during proxy contests is that when the independent inspector
of elections identifies a discrepancy between the number of shares voted and the
number of shares that DTC indicates are held for the broker, it contacts the
broker directly.132 At that point, it is the responsibility of the broker to reconcile
the two. Sometimes, the broker simply refuses to do so, as Deutsche Bank
Securities did from 1998 to 2003.133 The Deutsche Bank case gives some
indication of the dimensions of the problem. According to the NYSE report
summarizing the NYSE’s Division of Member Firm Regulation’s (MFR’s)
examination:134
For 2003, the MFR Examination identified 12 instances, out of 15 tested, in
which Respondent over-voted, that is, Respondent submitted more proxy
131. The New York Stock Exchange is aware of, and worried about, this problem. NYSE, Inc.,
Information Memo No. 04-58, Suspension of Proxy Activities and Over-Voting (Nov. 5, 2004).
132. E-mail from Edward B. Rock to John Wilcox (Oct. 10, 2007) (on file with author). In votes at
annual meetings not involving a contest, Broadridge typically resolves overvotes through an internal
reconciliation process. Id.
133. In re Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., NYSE Decision 05-45, para. 6 (Feb. 2, 2006).
134. Id. at paras. 26–28.
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votes than it was entitled to cast, in connection with proxy matters. For
example, in March 2003, Respondent cast a total of 8,537,151 shares in a
proxy matter involving “XYZ.” (record date March 4, 2003). As of the
record date, according to the information maintained at [DTC], Respon-
dent in fact was eligible to vote only 4,232,867 shares. Thus, the over-vote
in this matter was 4,304,284 shares. The over-votes submitted by Respon-
dent in the other 11 proxy matters in 2003 ranged from 16,710 shares to
2,152,721 shares.
. . . Enforcement’s investigation disclosed that, in 2002, Respondent over-
voted in 11 instances out of 12 tested. For example, in March 2002, Respon-
dent cast a total of 11,168,338 shares in a proxy matter involving “XYZ”
(record date March 5, 2002). As of the record date, according to the informa-
tion maintained at [DTC], Respondent in fact was eligible to vote only
6,679,676 shares. Thus, the over-vote was 4,488,662 shares. The over-votes
submitted by Respondent in the other 10 proxy matters in 2002 ranged from
31 shares to 1,876,283 shares.
. . . Respondent’s failure to reconcile the stock record in connection with
proxy voting instructions was a central cause of the over-votes set forth
above. In these uncontested matters, Respondent voted shares up to its
unreconciled unadjusted long position, which was generally greater than its
[DTC] position.
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But how should the broker reconcile the overvote? The Securities Industry
Association (SIA),135 in cooperation with the NYSE and the SEC, recently
examined the alternatives for resolving overvoting in an attempt to establish
industry best practices.136 In principle, there are two ways to reconcile any
mismatch: pre-mailing or post-mailing.137 If reconciled pre-mailing, the number
of shares for which voting instructions are solicited is adjusted downward to
match the number of votable shares. If reconciled post-mailing, the broker waits
to see if the number of shares for which voting instructions are received exceeds
the number of votable shares and makes a downward adjustment only if it does.
In effect, in post-mailing, any lent shares are first assigned to the accounts of
customers who did not return voting instructions.138 Any downward adjustment
(whether pre- or post-mailing) must be made in a manner that is “proportional
and equitable among all clients.”139 Two methods that meet this goal are an
impartial lottery among customers and proration (in other words, proportional
reduction of each margin account).
There are advantages and disadvantages to pre- and post-mailing reconcilia-
tion. Pre-mailing reconciliation allows the client to know from the voting card
precisely how many shares it may vote. On the other hand, because only 35% of
clients usually vote,140 pre-mailing reconciliation is more costly because it
requires reconciliation in a large number of cases where, in fact, the number of
shares for which (unreconciled) voting instructions are received does not exceed
the total number of shares in the brokerage account. Post-mailing reconciliation
has the opposite advantages and disadvantages. In addition, waiting for instruc-
tions to be received before making a reconciliation means that the broker has a
very short time window in which to reconcile an overvote, a process that
requires a large number of adjustments.
Moreover, post-mailing reconciliation generates another type of problem.
Because any lent shares are, in effect, first assigned to the accounts of customers
135. The SIA recently merged with the Bond Market Association to become The Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). See Welcome to SIFMA.org, http://www.sifma.org/about/
about.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
136. Letter from Donald Kittel, Executive Vice President, Sec. Indus. Assoc., to Anand Ramtahal,
Vice President of Member Firm Regulation, NYSE (Apr. 26, 2005) [hereinafter SIA Letter], available
at http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment_letters/comment_letter_archives/6136.pdf; see also SEC.
INDUS. ASSOC., PROXY SUGGESTED PRACTICES (2006), available at http://www.sifma.org/services/techops/
pdf/ProxyGuidelinesSep2006.pdf [hereinafter SIA, PROXY PRACTICES].
137. Broadridge provides a service (the “Over Reporting Prevention Service”) that compares “a
participant’s reported position to its DTC position, flags any differences, and enables the participant to
make appropriate adjustments.” SIA Letter, supra note 136, at 2. In 2005, 100 brokers representing
more than 90% of street positions used the service. Id.
138. The NYSE appears to permit the practice of assigning voting instructions to shares with respect
to which voting instructions have not been received, so long as there is no “overvote”—in other words,
the votes do not exceed the shares in the broker’s possession on the record date. Wilcox et al., supra
note 46, at 12-20 (citing Letter from the NYSE to the Commerce, Consumer & Monetary Affairs
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov’t Relations (Feb. 19, 1991)).
139. SIA Letter, supra note 136, at 3; see SIA, PROXY PRACTICES, supra note 136, at 3 n.7.
140. SIA, PROXY PRACTICES, supra note 136, at 3.
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who did not return voting instructions, the number of votes cast will be
systematically greater and the number of non-votes correspondingly lower
than in the case in which there has been no lending. The effects of this bias
in favor of more votes are exactly the opposite of the effects of fewer votes
resulting from materials not arriving: any matters where a failure to vote or
to submit instructions is equivalent to a “no” vote become easier to pass.
This makes it easier for managers to obtain the requisite votes on mergers,
charter amendments, and director elections, but also makes it easier for share-
holder proponents to secure the vote needed for the passage of a shareholder
resolution.141
The interaction between the accuracy of the vote count and the level of short
selling explains why, in close votes, we may have little reason to trust the
outcome. When, for example, the AXA/MONY merger was approved by 1.7
million shares at a time when 6.2 million shares were out on loan,142 can we be
confident that it was approved by the votes of people who actually owned the
shares?
C. PATHOLOGIES OF MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN VOTING RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC
INTEREST
The concepts of record dates and record holders—albeit necessary (to some
extent) to make a voting system for public corporations workable—result in a
discrepancy between beneficial economic stakes in the company and voting
rights. Voting rights rest with the record holder on the record date. But that
record holder may not have any beneficial economic ownership in the company
for three reasons:
● The record holder is a street-name holder (a bank or broker) who never
had a beneficial economic interest.
● The shares have been sold after the record date and before the vote.
● The holder has hedged its economic exposure to the company.
By the same token, a holder may have a beneficial economic interest, but no
141. The pre-mailing proration approach is consistent with the U.C.C. article 8 structure of property
rights. U.C.C. section 8-503(b), provides that when the broker does not have enough shares to cover all
of the securities entitlements:
An entitlement holder’s property interest with respect to a particular financial asset under
subsection (a) is a pro rata property interest in all interests in that financial asset held by the
securities intermediary, without regard to the time the entitlement holder acquired the security
entitlement or the time the securities intermediary acquired the interest in that financial asset.
U.C.C. § 8-503(b) (amended 2003). However, because U.C.C. article 8 is designed to govern custodial
arrangements and to minimize failed securities transactions, it is not clear whether it should be viewed
as a source for more-general obligations between brokers and customers. Thus, we do not mean to
suggest that the pre-mailing proration approach is required by the U.C.C.
142. Drummond, supra note 3, at 96; Floyd Norris, Holders of MONY Approve $1.5 Billion Sale to
AXA, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2004, at C4.
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voting rights (because it is not a record holder, because it has bought the shares
after the record date, or because it is a counterparty to a hedging transaction).
The various regulations discussed above are designed (largely, but not wholly,
successfully) to deal with the first of these reasons. But they do not begin to
address the other two reasons for the discrepancy. Thus, in the present regime,
there will be some persons with voting rights and no beneficial interest, and others
with a beneficial interest and no voting rights. The more liquid the market for the
shares, and the larger the market for derivatives, the more often this will occur.
Discrepancies between voting rights and beneficial interests can arise in two
contexts: first, as an unintended consequence of a transaction undertaken for
other reasons (for example, when a person buys shares after the record date
because she believes the stock price will increase); second, for the purpose of
obtaining votes without an equivalent economic exposure (for example, when a
person buys shares before and sells them after the record date so that she can
vote the shares without having any economic exposure). We will use the term
“incidental discrepancies” to connote the former and the term “empty voting”—
coined by our colleagues Henry Hu and Bernie Black143—to connote the latter.
1. Pathology 6: Incidental Discrepancies
To examine the effect of incidental discrepancies, one has to engage in two
inquiries: first, how will investors vote who have votes but no economic interest;
and second, how would the investors have voted who have an economic interest
but do not have votes?
As to investors with voting rights and no economic interest, one possibility is
that they will not bother to vote at all. In fact, some institutional shareholders
have a policy of not voting in such situations.144 As discussed with respect to
pathologies related to materials not arriving and votes not being counted, a
failure to vote can be, depending on the issue voted on, equivalent to the
pro-management vote, equivalent to an anti-management vote, or neutral. An-
other possibility is that the investor will cast a less-informed vote.145 Again,
143. Hu & Black, supra note 128, at 1011, 1024–37; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote
Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 812 (2006).
144. Eric D. Roiter, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Fidelity Management and
Research Co., Remarks at the Columbia Law School Conference: Shareholder Democracy: Its Promises
and Perils (Nov. 18, 2005).
145. As discussed earlier, Delaware focuses on record ownership. See supra text accompanying
notes 24–32. In two cases, Chancellor William T. Allen suggested some equitable limits to voting such
shares. In Commonwealth Associates v. Providence Health Care, Inc., Chancellor Allen presumed that a
post-record-date sale of shares would carry with it the right to vote the shares. 641 A.2d 155, 155–58
(Del. Ch. 1993). Indeed, he suggested that any contractual agreement to permit the selling shareholder
to retain the votes without also retaining “an interest sufficient to support the granting of an irrevocable
proxy with respect to the shares” would not be enforceable. Id. at 158. In an earlier opinion, Chancellor
Allen stated:
[T]he ‘seller’ of stock loses the equitable interest once a specifically enforceable contract of
sale is formed. It is the binding nature of this contract and its specific enforceability under the
law that gives to the “buyer” the present equitable right as it may be deemed to have, such as
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depending on the issue, this may be a pro- or anti-management vote. Third, in
some instances in which there is a relationship, the investor with the voting
rights may look to the investor with the economic stake for suggestions on how
to vote.146 Finally, the investor’s vote may be influenced by extrinsic factors
(for example, by an attempt to curry favor with management).
As to investors who have an economic interest but no votes, there is no
particular reason to believe that their votes would differ from similar investors
with both a vote and an economic interest. But even so, the fact that some
investors with a beneficial stake have no vote would add noise to the voting
outcome which may result (on average) in an inferior outcome.
Since institutional investors trade more frequently than individual investors,
they are more likely to find themselves in a position in which they have
purchased shares after the record date, and thus have an economic stake and no
voting rights. Though institutions are also more likely to sell shares between the
record date and the meeting, they often do not vote in such a situation.147
Incidental discrepancies, therefore, are likely to reduce the relative influence of
institutional investors.
2. Pathology 7: Empty Voting
Of late, an esoteric and theoretically interesting pathology has emerged which
goes by the name of “empty voting”148 or “encumbered shares.”149 “Empty
voting” refers to instances in which some shareholders have more votes than
economic interest.150 This can occur through a variety of different techniques
and can be intentional or unintentional. We address empty voting briefly here
because it illustrates a particular sort of gaming of a complex system. We do not
address it in detail because it has already been the subject of substantial
scholarly attention151 and because we are uncertain of its real world signifi-
cance, at least in the United States.
The most notorious example of intentional empty voting arose in the pro-
the right to compel a proxy from the registered owner or, more directly, to have its vote
counted by the court in an election contest.
Len v. Fuller, No. Civ. A. 15352, 1997 WL 305833, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1997). Neither opinion,
however, bars empty voting and, in impersonal markets, the post-record-date buyer will not be able to
execute a proxy.
146. For example, counterparties in swap transactions, typically banks, may look to the holder of the
economic interest to get a “wink or a nod” on how to vote. Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Loophole Lets a
Foot in the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at C01.
147. Roiter, supra note 144.
148. Hu & Black, supra note 128, at 1014.
149. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775 (2005).
150. Hu & Black, supra note 128, at 1014.
151. The market for record-date ownership is described and discussed in Susan E.K. Christoffersen
et al., Vote Trading and Information Aggregation, 62 J. FIN. 2897 (2007), and in Christopher C. Geczy
et al., Stocks Are Special Too: An Analysis of the Equity Lending Market, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 241 (2002).
The issues relating to empty voting are extensively discussed in Martin & Partnoy, supra note 149, and
in Hu & Black, supra note 128.
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posed Mylan King merger. In July 2004, Mylan Laboratories entered into a
merger agreement with King Pharmaceutical, according to which, subject
to shareholder approval, Mylan would acquire King for Mylan shares.152
Perry Corp., a hedge fund, was a large shareholder in King and supported
the merger.153 While the deal was seen as favorable to King, the market re-
action to the merger for Mylan was negative, and some large shareholders of
Mylan, including Carl Icahn, threatened to vote against it.154 As a result,
approval of the merger by Mylan shareholders was in doubt.155 Perry then
acquired 9.9% of Mylan’s shares and entered into “equity swaps” with Bear
Stearns and Goldman Sachs which fully hedged its economic exposure to
Mylan’s share price.156 As a result, Perry acquired shares—and votes—in
Mylan which it could vote purely on the basis of its interest as a King
shareholder. See Figure 12.
The divergence between the interests of Perry and those of other Mylan
shareholders is obvious. If the merger was good for King but bad for Mylan, as
many Mylan shareholders felt, Perry would still vote its sizeable position in
Mylan in favor of the merger and could help push it through. As it happened,
152. See Robert Steyer, Mylan and Icahn Turn Up the Volume, THESTREET.COM, Dec. 22, 2004,
http://www.thestreet.com/_yahoo/stocks/robertsteyer/10200481.html.
153. See Robert Steyer, New Player Joins Mylan-King Fray, THESTREET.COM, Nov. 29, 2004,
http://www.thestreet.com/_yahoo/stocks/robertsteyer/10196467.html.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See Steyer, supra note 152.
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Mylan management terminated the merger agreement because negotiations fell
through after King restated its earnings.157 The success, and legal validity, of
Perry’s strategy thus was not tested.158
Intentional empty voting has different, and more disconcerting, ramifica-
tions than incidental discrepancies. In economic effect—albeit not in legal
structure159—it resembles vote buying. An investor who goes out of its way
to buy votes is likely to vote the shares, and because that investor decided
to divest its economic interest in the company, it may well vote them in a
manner that reduces the value of the company.160 Intentional empty voting, to
the extent it occurs, will thus tend to result in systematically inferior voting
outcomes.
D. THE EFFECT OF THE PATHOLOGIES ON CORPORATE VOTES
As the preceding discussion shows, the various pathologies have different,
and complex, effects on corporate votes. Specifically, the effects of the patholo-
gies can be grouped into several categories. First, whether the pathology
increases the error rate (or generates “noise”)—that is, yields a voting out-
come that is less reflective of the outcome that a majority of well-informed
shareholders would have voted for. Second, whether the pathology results in
fewer shares being voted or in more shares being voted. Third, whether the
pathology empowers or disempowers certain groups of shareholders. And fourth,
whether the pathology biases the voting outcome in a pro- or anti-management
direction.
Table 1 summarizes the effects of each pathology with respect to each of
these categories. A few comments on the Table are in order. Almost by defini-
tion, each pathology generates some noise as each results in discrepancies
between investors with effective voting rights and investors with a beneficial
stake in the company. In the case of votes not being counted due to early
closing, this “noise” is mainly symbolic as inspectors will only close the polls
157. Icahn Wins as Mylan, King Deal Dies, FORBES.COM, Mar. 4, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/2005/
03/04/cx_gl_0304faceweek_print.html.
158. Other, more-traditional conflicts of interest in voting were also present. Icahn had a stake of
about ten percent in Mylan, both in terms of economic exposure and in terms of voting rights. But
Icahn also had shorted 5.3 million shares of King stock. Id. Icahn could thus have an economic interest
to oppose the merger, even if the merger were in the interest of Mylan, as long as the market thought
that the merger would be significantly more beneficial to King. In that event, Icahn would gain more
from a defeat of the merger through his short position in King than he lost on account of his long
position in Mylan. For example, suppose Icahn shorted the King shares at $30 per share, so that the
shares would go up to $40 per share if the merger was completed but down to $20 per share if the
merger failed. Icahn would then profit from defeating the merger if his profits from shorting were
greater than the increase in the value of his Mylan stake from approving the merger.
159. Vote buying traditionally involves an acquisition of votes without an acquisition of an eco-
nomic stake. Empty voting typically involves an acquisition of shares—vote plus stake—and a separate
transaction to divest the economic stake.
160. Empty voting also results in investors who have an economic interest but no voting rights. As
to them, the analysis is the same as for incidental discrepancies.
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early if the outcome is not in question. For incidental discrepancies and, even
more so, for intentional empty voting, the degree of noise is likely to be high.
These pathologies result not only in some investors with economic stakes
having no effective voting rights, but in other investors that have no economic
stakes but do have votes, and, at least in the case of intentional empty voting,
those others are likely to exercise their voting rights.
161. Discussed infra section IV.B.
162. Discussed infra section IV.C.
Table 1. The Effect of the Pathologies
Pathology 1
Materials
Do Not
Arrive
Pathology 2
Votes Not
Counted—
Early
Closing
Pathology 2
Votes Not
Counted—by
Mistake
Pathology 3
Verification
Pathology 4
Securities
Lending
Surprise
Pathology 5
Over-
Voting
Pathology 6
Incidental
Discre-
pancies
Pathology 7
Empty
Voting
Effect
Noise Some Symbolic Some Some Some Some Some or More Lots
Number of
Shares
Fewer Fewer Fewer No Effect No Effect More Fewer More
Shareholder
Group Effect
Fewer Votes
for
Individual
Investors
Unclear Unclear No Effect Fewer Votes
for
Institutional
Investors;
Possibly
More Votes
to
Short-Sellers
Maybe Fewer
Votes for
Individual
Investors
Fewer Votes for
Institutional
Investors; Votes
to Shareholders
Without
Beneficial
Interest
More Votes
for Investors
with Bad
Incentives
Implication
Discretionary
Broker
Voting
Pro-
Management
N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. Anti-
Management
N.A. N.A.
Election of
Directors
Anti-
Management
Symbolic Neutral Neutral Neutral Pro-
Management
Anti-
Management
or Neutral
Strong, but
Direction
Unpredictable
Mergers/
Charter
Amend-
ments
Anti-
Management
Symbolic Anti-
Management
Neutral Neutral Pro-
Management
Anti-
Management
Strong, but
Direction
Unpredictable
Shareholder
Proposals
Pro-
Management
Symbolic Neutral Neutral Neutral Anti-
Management
Pro-
Management
Strong, but
Direction
Upredictable
Reforms
Longer time
Between
Record and
Meeting Date
Improves Worsens
Pre-
Announce-
ment of
Agenda
Improves Worsens
Enhanced
Scrutiny
Improves
BRT/
George-
son161
Improves Improves Improves Improves
Spanish
Model162
Improves Improves Improves Improves Improves
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Some, but not all, of the pathologies affect the total number of shares that are
likely to have effective votes. Specifically, if materials do not arrive in time or
some votes are not counted, the affected shareholders are deprived of effective
voting rights. Overvoting means that voting instructions are solicited from more
shareholders than are entitled to vote, which will tend to raise the number of
shares being voted, but if proper adjustments are not made, overvoting can lead
to a wholesale disqualification of votes and thus to fewer shares being effec-
tively voted. Incidental discrepancies can reduce the number of shares being
voted because record owners who do not have a beneficial stake are less likely
to bother to vote than beneficial owners.
The number of shares with effective votes, in turn, relates to whether certain
shareholder groups gain or lose power. The pathology of materials not arriving
is likely to primarily affect individual shareholders. By contrast, institutional
shareholders are more likely to be affected by incidental discrepancies be-
cause they trade more frequently than individual holders and are thus more
likely to acquire shares between the record date and the meeting date. Patholo-
gies 4 and 5, respectively, relate to the lending of shares mostly held in
institutional and individual accounts and thus reduce the voting power of the
respective shareholder group. Moreover, securities lending can result in short-
sellers having voting rights (if they do not sell the “borrowed” shares prior to
the record date). To the extent that some shareholder groups are more likely to
vote a certain way than another, the shareholder-group effect will also bias the
outcome of a vote.
Finally, the number of shares with effective votes has direct and complex
effects on the outcome of a vote. To the extent that brokers have discretionary
voting authority over shares for which they receive no voting instructions (and
because brokers tend to vote in accordance with management recommenda-
tions), having fewer shares for which instructions are received biases the
outcome in favor of the outcome desired by management.
To the extent that adopting a proposal requires a majority of the shares
entitled to vote—as is the case for mergers and charter amendments—a non-
vote is equivalent to an “against” vote. Fewer shares with effective votes result
in more non-votes, which makes passage of these proposals more difficult.
More shares with effective votes result in fewer non-votes, and makes passage
easier.
Yet other matters are both non-routine and require a majority of the shares
present at the meeting. This tends to be the case for shareholder proposals under
Rule 14a-8163 (which are generally opposed by management) and uncontested
director elections under a majority-voting rule (where management favors the
election of the nominees). With respect to these matters, shares that are not at all
present at the meeting do not affect the outcome, but shares that are present and
abstain are equivalent to “against” votes. Because brokers will often continue to
163. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007).
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enjoy discretionary voting authority over some matters on the ballot, fewer
shares with effective votes can result in more shares being present but not
voting on these matters.164 As a result, the effective rule for electing directors
under a nominal “majority-voting” rule and for the passage of a shareholder
proposal is, in fact, a supermajority of the votes cast.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND AVENUES OF REFORM
A. INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS
There are a variety of incremental changes to the system that should be
considered.
1. Adjusting the Relation Between the Record Date and the Meeting
Announcement
The non-delivery of materials is aggravated by the relatively compressed
time frame between the record date and the meeting. Although this problem
could be ameliorated by increasing the time between the record date and the
meeting date, the longer the time between the record date and the meeting, the
more shares will have been sold and the larger the percentage of record-date
shareholders without any economic interest.
Consider another possibility. The “securities lending surprise” pathology
derives from the practice of setting the record date before the meeting and its
agenda are announced. In order to allow share lenders to recall their shares in
advance of meetings in which they would like to vote, one could require that the
board announce the date of the meeting and its agenda at the same time as it
announces the record date.165 Apart from permitting investors to decide whether
to freeze/recall shares with greater knowledge of what they will be asked to vote
on, this would limit the discretion of management to set a record date strategi-
cally in order to affect the outcome of the vote. Prior announcement of the
agenda would also enable other investors to buy shares in order to influence the
outcome of the meeting. As one informed observer commented, “If you did that,
can you imagine the volume of trading in advance of the record date?”166
Although this could make issuers nervous, it could also invigorate annual
meetings.
164. This, however, will not be the case where votes are not counted (Pathology 2). Also, with
respect to incidental discrepancies (Pathology 6), the anti-management effect of fewer shares with
effective votes for director election may be made up by a possible tendency of record owners without
economic stakes to vote in favor of management’s nominees.
165. The company may, at that point, not know which shareholder proposals will be on the agenda.
But with respect to shareholder proposals, shareholder activists can announce well in advance of a
meeting that they intend to pursue some issues. This, in theory, provides an opportunity for fellow
shareholders to recall their shares.
166. Confidential oral communication to author.
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2. Encouraging Improvements Through Judicial Eyebrows
Delaware seeks to maximize certainty by adopting presumptions and ignor-
ing the complexity of indirect ownership. The result, as described above, is a
system without vote verification or an effective audit trail. What if Dela-
ware were to shift its presumptions slightly, and instead imposed the burden
of establishing that the requisite margin had been achieved on the proponent
of a transaction (for example, a party claiming that a merger has been ap-
proved)?
Such a shift could lead to a transformation of the system. One of the reasons
that the system is inadequate is that no one has an incentive to make it better.
Close and skeptical scrutiny by the Delaware courts in voting disputes could
create such an incentive. If participants thought that there was a chance that a
vote would be rejected because of an inadequate audit trail, they would take
greater care at earlier stages to assure proper documentation. But, for Delaware,
close scrutiny may have a significant drawback: in addition to reducing cer-
tainty, it would reveal the inadequacy of the voting system and thus potentially
impair its legitimacy. Delaware hardly has an incentive to undermine public
confidence in a key legitimating practice that is fundamental to the structure of
corporate law.
B. RENOVATING THE STRUCTURE: THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE/GEORGESON PROPOSAL
In connection with the shareholder ballot access proposal, the Business
Roundtable, together with Georgeson, a leading proxy-solicitation firm, pro-
posed returning primary voting responsibility to the beneficial owners.167 The
BRT/Georgeson proposal entails the following steps:
● On the record date, DTC would (as it does now) issue omnibus proxies
to its members. These members would then (contrary to present prac-
tice) pass proxies down the chain, eventually arriving at the beneficial
owners.168
● At the same time, brokers, banks, or their agents would generate lists of
beneficial owners as of the record date and indicating the number of
shares held. These lists would be integrated and verified to create a list
of shareholders who are entitled to receive proxy materials, make voting
decisions, and sign proxies.169
167. Bus. Roundtable Petition, supra note 75; Letter from John C. Wilcox, Vice Chairman, George-
son Shareholder Communications, Inc., to the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/gshareholder041204.pdf; see Letter from John C. Wilcox,
Vice Chairman, Georgeson Shareholder Communications, Inc., to Johnathan Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (May 3, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/4-493/georgeson050304.pdf;
see also Wilcox, supra note 113, at 9–11.
168. See Wilcox, supra note 113, at 10.
169. See id.
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● The shareholder list would be available to the issuer and to any dissi-
dents running a solicitation, who could distribute the proxy materials
directly to the beneficial owners.170
● Beneficial owners would return proxies directly to the tabulators.171
There are several notable features of this proposal. See Figure 13. It takes
broker and bank custodians out of the process of collecting and processing
voting instructions.172 It increases ownership transparency, and it eliminates the
existing NOBO/OBO structure. Shareholders who wished to remain anonymous
would have to establish nominee accounts with banks or brokers.
The proposed system would ameliorate several of the voting pathologies
discussed above. By simplifying the system of distributing proxy materials
and collecting votes, it would reduce the likelihood of materials not arriving
or of votes not being counted. By requiring up-front attribution of shares to
owners by intermediaries, it would eliminate overvoting. By increasing
transparency, it would improve the ability to provide vote confirmation and
an audit trail.
What are the difficulties in the way of such a reform? One key effect is to
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. As a result, the proposal would eliminate “broker non-votes.”
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remove Broadridge from its position as the key, monopolistic actor at the center
of the spiderweb. Under the current system, Broadridge is hired by the custodi-
ans but is able to bill the issuers, with some price regulation by the NYSE. By
all accounts, this is a very profitable business for Broadridge, and one would
thus predict that Broadridge would oppose any substantial reform.
The reform also requires that custodians cooperate in the creation of a single
list of shareholders entitled to vote as of the record date. Specifically, brokers
would have to identify which shares have been lent out. This could lead margin-
account holders (who at present are blissfully unaware whether and how often
their shares are lent out) to demand a share of the fees generated.173 Indeed, the
Securities Industry Association, the broker-dealers’ trade association, opposed
the BRT proposal, arguing that no fundamental change was necessary.174
Finally, the elimination of the NOBO/OBO system would expose beneficial
owners to more direct lobbying by issuers and others, such as unions and
environmental groups. While holders who wish to retain their anonymity may
create nominee accounts to disguise their ownership, this is more expensive
than merely checking the OBO box and some holders may feel that taking that
affirmative step will subject them to more criticism than under the existing
NOBO/OBO system.
C. REDESIGNING THE ARCHITECTURE: VOTING IN A DIRECT REGISTRATION CLEARING
AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (THE “SPANISH” MODEL)
As our earlier discussion shows, the problems with the corporate voting
system derive from the complexity of our system of custodial ownership, a
system adopted to deal with the “paper crunch” and to prevent systemic risk
from widespread failure of clearing and settlement. In responding to these
problems, the United States chose “immobilization” of securities through the
depositary system: by having DTC keep securities certificates in its vaults, we
controlled the risk of non-delivery of certificates and failed trades. More subtly,
because the certificates still existed, we did not need to become accustomed to
the concept of securities that are not evidenced by certificates, or move com-
pletely to a book-entry system.
No one designing a system today from the ground up would (or, in fact, does)
adopt this structure.175 The necessity of immobilizing securities certificates
173. On the other hand, tax considerations may force this identification because of the IRS’s position
that payments in lieu of dividends are not entitled to privileged tax treatment. I.R.S. Notice 2003-67,
2003-2 C.B. 752 (The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003—Information Reporting
for Payments in Lieu of Dividends).
174. Letter from Donald D. Kittell, Executive Vice President, Sec. Indus. Ass’n, to Johnathan G.
Katz, Sec’y, SEC (June 24, 2004), available at http://www.sia.com/2004_comment_letters/pdf/
30454888.pdf (writing in opposition).
175. UNIDROIT (the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law) is currently develop-
ing a legal framework for the cross-border clearing and settlement of intermediated securities with the
goal of producing a convention that will be adopted by states. UNIDROIT, Substantive Rules Regard-
ing Intermediated Securities (Study 78), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/workprogramme/
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yielded the cumbersome system of custody, clearance, and settlement that
complicates voting as well. The BRT/Georgeson proposal, taking this fundamen-
tal architecture of ownership as given, offers a change to the voting architecture
that promises some improvements. A more-fundamental reform would entail a
“dematerialization,” rather than a mere “immobilization,” of securities.176 This
makes possible the creation of a share registry that can show all current holders
and quickly reflect changes in securities positions.
Interestingly, the Spanish system of shareholding took that route and, thus,
offers an interesting alternative.177 For listed shares, Spain has a pure book-
entry system with share dematerialization mandatory for publicly traded firms.178
The key player is IBERCLEAR, the Spanish equivalent of DTC. “IBERCLEAR
is in charge of both the Register of Securities, held in book-entry form, and the
Clearing & Settlement of all trades from the Spanish Stock Exchanges.”179 In
order to issue securities that will be validly issued and tradable, the issuer must
inform IBERCLEAR that the steps for listing a security have been completed
and provide relevant details.180 At this point, the securities are “deemed to be
study078/item1/overview.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). The working papers, available at the UNIDROIT
Study 78 website, provide a wealth of information on the different systems of indirect ownership of
securities in different countries. UNIDROIT, Intermediated Securities, Study LXXVIII, http://
www.unidroit.org/english/workprogramme/study078/item1/main.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2008).
176. In the SEC’s 1976 report on nominee ownership, the SEC recognized the trade-off between
incremental and fundamental reform. See SEC, SEC STREET NAME STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
NO. 672. One potential reform considered was termed the “transfer agent depository concept” which
“would replace the certificate with computerized stockowner lists, maintained by the transfer agent,
which would serve as both the issuer’s stock records and the shareowner’s evidence of ownership.” Id.
at 60. But the SEC did not embrace the proposal, noting:
The Commission has concluded that no alternative approach would facilitate shareowner
communications without disrupting the current system of clearance and settlement, imposing
significant costs and recordkeeping requirements on participants, or involving major computer
development . . . . The [transfer agent depository] concept exhibits promise as an important
long-term alternative. It is not, however, a system for streamlining communications but rather
an approach to a national clearance and settlement system which, as a by-product, would
improve issuer-shareowner communications.
Id. at 62.
177. The description of the “Spanish” model in the text is somewhat simplified in order to focus
attention on its role in simplifying corporate voting, and therefore ignores the important issues of
clearing and settlement. For an overview and descriptions of different types of systems of indirect
holding, see UNIDROIT, WORKING PAPER REGARDING SO CALLED “TRANSPARENT SYSTEMS” (2006),
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/proceedings/2006/study/78/s-78-44-e.pdf [here-
inafter UNIDROIT, TRANSPARENT SYSTEMS 2006] and UNIDROIT, SUPPLEMENTARY WORKING PAPER
REGARDING SO-CALLED “TRANSPARENT SYSTEMS” (2007), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/
publications/proceedings/2007/study/78/s-78-44add-e.pdf.
178. EUROPEAN COMM’N, FINANCIAL MARKETS INFRASTRUCTURE: EU CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT, LEGAL
CERTAINTY GROUP, QUESTIONNAIRE, HORIZONTAL ANSWERS para. 1.7.15 (2005), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/certainty/background/comparative_survey_en.pdf;
see also UNIDROIT, TRANSPARENT SYSTEMS 2006, supra note 177, at 6–7.
179. IBERCLEAR Home Page, http://www.iberclear.com/Iberclear/home/home.htm (last visited Jan.
2, 2008).
180. EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 178, at para. 2.7.2.
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duly recorded in the accounts held by IBERCLEAR as CSD [Central Securities
Depositary] and its participant entities,”181 and the investors have full property
rights in the shares. The act of recording creates a direct legal relationship
between the issuer and the investor.182
Transfer of securities is by book entry, without any requirement of “delivery”
of share certificates (which, in this system, do not exist).183 This same prin-
ciple applies to the creation of security interests in the shares.184 In practical
terms, when an order to transfer is received from a seller, and the owner-
ship of the seller and payments by the buyer are verified, the transfer occurs
and the share registry is immediately adjusted.185 Unlike in the U.S. system,
there is no netting of securities but only of cash.186 In this system, trans-
fers are irrevocable.187 The buyer takes the shares subject to any recorded
interests.188
In a book-entry system, the question arises whether to have a one-tier or
two-tier registry. In the Spanish system, the registry is structured as a two-
tier system. In the top tier, IBERCLEAR maintains accounts for securities
owned by its participants. In the lower tier, participants maintain accounts for
other investors.189 The introduction of a second tier complicates the voting
process and is not an intrinsic part of the system. Indeed, one suspects that
the reason for the two-tier system is to maintain the link between the par-
ticipant firms and their customers. Were IBERCLEAR to control the sole
and complete registry—which, as a data processing matter, would be straight-
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.; see also id. para. 7.7. Under Article 9 of the Spanish Securities Markets Act, “Transfer of
book-entry securities takes place by means of account transfer. The inscription of the transfer in favour
of the acquirer will produce the same legal effects [as] the delivery of the physical securities.” Id. para.
2.7.2. (providing English translation).
184. Id. para. 2.7.2. The European Commission’s comparative survey describes Spanish law on the
subject:
According to article 10 of the Securities markets law, “The creation of limited rights in rem or
liens of any other kind on securities represented by book-entry shall be recorded on the
corresponding account. (. . .). The creation of the lien is valid vis-à-vis third parties from the
time the corresponding entry is recorded[”].
And article 9 of the same Law foresees: “A third party purchasing for consideration
securities represented by book entry from a person who was legitimately entitled to transfer
such securities according to the book entry records shall not be subject to any claim
(reivindicatio) unless said third party acted in bad faith or with gross negligence at the time of
purchase.”
Id. para. 11.7 (quoting the Spanish Securities Markets Act).
185. Id. paras. 17.7, 19.7, 20.7, 21.7, 55.7.
186. Although the U.S. system (according to which the shares sold by Morgan Stanley customers to
JP Morgan customers are netted at the end of each day against the shares sold by JP Morgan customers
to Morgan Stanley customers) had some advantages prior to the evolution of modern information
processing, the costs of not being able to trace particular transfers can be significant.
187. EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 178, para. 21.7.
188. Id. para. 11.7.
189. Id. para. 5.7.
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forward and advantageous—customers could go to any broker to sell their
securities.
There are numerous advantages to a book-entry system. First, because the
investors have clear property rights in the shares, problems of the bankruptcy of
the intermediary disappear. Second, because transfers are final only after check-
ing on the ownership of the seller and the available cash of the buyer, failed
transfers should not occur. Third, shortfalls, in principle, should not occur
either. Fourth, the system simplifies the payment of dividends and other cash
distributions.190 On the record date, IBERCLEAR certifies to the issuer the
balance of securities that each participant has. The issuer then pays each
participant an amount equal to the dividend per share times the number of
shares evidenced in the IBERCLEAR certification.191
Most pertinently, from our perspective, the Spanish model simplifies voting.
Consider Figures 14 and 15. With a book-entry system, whether one- or
two-tier, creation of a common comprehensive registry is straightforward.192
Once this real-time registry exists, creating a record-date shareholder list is
190. Id. para. 34.7.
191. Id. para. 34.7.1.
192. In Spain, IBERCLEAR certifies to the issuer how the securities are distributed among the
participants in the system. Id. para. 36.7. Then, for voting, the issuer sends an “attendance card” to the
investor. Id. para. 34.7.1. Since 2003, issuers have been obliged to provide for “distance voting”
through mail or electronic means. Id.
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also straightforward. Indeed, in Spain, the record date is mere five days in
advance of the meeting.193 The processor, an agent of the issuer, would send
out proxy materials according to a preliminary shareholder list, supplement
with changes as of the record date, collect proxies, check the proxies against
the record-date list, tabulate the results and report them to the board of
directors.
The Spanish model easily solves some of the most difficult problems identi-
fied above. The share registry, combined with IBERCLEAR’s obligation to
assure that no more than 100% of issued securities are recorded in the sys-
tem,194 solves the overvoting problem. The existence of an up-to-date, compre-
hensive share registry also cuts through the complexity in the distribution of
materials, solicitation of voting instructions, collection of proxies, and the
verification and audit of votes. A shorter period between the record and the
meeting date made possible by the Spanish model would reduce the degree of
incidental discrepancies between voting rights and beneficial ownership. Fi-
nally, because the share registry is continuously updated, it would be relatively
simple—if the substantive corporate law demanded it—to enforce a system in
which only shares that were held on the record date and then continuously held
193. Art. CIV of the Public Companies Act.
194. Id. para. 36.7.
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between the record date and the meeting date could be voted.195 This would
further reduce incidental discrepancies and foreclose some avenues to obtain
“empty votes.” Finally, a late record date would make it easier for investors to
avoid the securities lending surprise.196 Indeed, the structure of the Spanish
system, with its genuine share registry, could be developed far beyond what has
been done in Spain to make voting even more efficient.
There are few legal or practical obstacles to switching to a Spanish-style
system. U.C.C. Article 8 already permits uncertificated securities and provides a
legal structure for transfer.197 Under states’ corporate laws, corporations may
issue uncertificated equity securities.198 Uncertificated bonds are already very
common.199
As a practical matter, a move to uncertificated securities would also not pose
many problems, even for existing companies with outstanding certificated
shares. To start, the board of directors of a company would pass a resolution
providing that all classes and all series of its stock shall be uncertificated shares.
At that point, DTC would surrender all its certificates to the corporation,
instantly converting around 80% of the shares to book-entry. While other
shareholders may not surrender their certificates, it would matter little: those
shareholders are already registered owners and listed on the company’s share
registry. As a result, the company can already, and could continue to, communi-
cate with them directly. Moreover, when their shares were eventually sold or
transferred (through probate or otherwise), the securities would likely be surren-
dered at that time, either directly or through DTC. Over time, the number of
outstanding share certificates would quickly dwindle. All new securities would
be issued in uncertificated form.
Of course, there are some downsides to a book-entry system. As with the
BRT/Georgeson proposal, it is inconsistent with the existing NOBO/OBO
system. In the Spanish system, if investors wish to remain anonymous, they
195. It thus could solve one version of empty voting (record-date capture), but not other versions
(for example, hedging while retaining ownership).
196. Note how securities “lending” occurs in this system. Because securities “lending” is really a
transfer of a security subject to an obligation to retransfer an equivalent security later, the securities
“loan” itself would be recorded on the registry as a transfer (with the “return” similarly recorded). Thus,
the system forces an attribution of “lent” shares to specific accounts, with notice to the account holder,
while also ensuring that no more than 100% of the shares appear. Because each securities loan involves
an actual recorded transfer of shares on the registry, the cost of securities lending may increase, as
intermediaries will not be able to lend securities out of the “float”—the aggregate of shares which are
unlikely to be sold during a given period.
197. U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory note (amended 2003).
198. Delaware, for example, provides:
The shares of a corporation shall be represented by certificates, provided that the board of
directors of the corporation may provide by resolution or resolutions that some or all of any or
all classes or series of its stock shall be uncertificated shares. Any such resolution shall not
apply to shares represented by a certificate until such certificate is surrendered to the corporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 158 (Supp. 2006).
199. U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory note.
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must hold their shares through a nominee.200 But that seems like a small price to
pay given the multiple advantages that a book-entry system offers.
The principal obstacles to reform are political. Broadridge, with its monopoly
under the current system, has an incentive to oppose a reform such as this that
would displace it from the center of the spider web. Brokers, unless the system
is set up to protect their customer relationships, are also likely to oppose a
change. Brokers may further oppose a change because it would eliminate their
ability to lend out margin securities without telling the account holder and thus
increase their costs.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR SHAREHOLDERS’ ROLE
The existing system of shareholder voting is crude, imprecise, and fragile. Gil
Sparks, a leading Delaware lawyer, estimates that, in a contest that is closer than
55 to 45%, there is no verifiable answer to the question “who won?”201 Suppose
that Gil Sparks is right. Does it matter?
One might well argue that, ex ante, the inadequacies of the Florida punch-
card ballot system in the 2000 presidential election were evenly distributed
between Bush and Gore, and that the infirmities had an equal chance of tilting
the election towards one or the other. But that is hardly an adequate response to
the challenge posed by that election—or to a corporate vote with a close
outcome. Whatever the overall distribution of errors, the participants in a
specific vote have a large stake in the accuracy of the outcome. This is true
regardless of whether the voting pathologies generate a bias or merely noise,
whether they empower or disempower certain shareholder groups or merely fail
to provide vote confirmation and an audit trail. Delaware’s “not my problem”
establishment of legal presumptions cannot forever paper over the embarrass-
ment of our present voting system.
One response, discussed earlier, is to improve the technology so that it would
function more reliably and accurately. Improvements are possible—and neces-
sary—but some problems are bound to persist. What one should strive for is a
system adequate for the tasks given it.
This takes us back to the fundamental question of the role of voting in
corporate law. As noted earlier, shareholders vote on very few things. Most
importantly, shareholders vote for directors and have a veto over fundamental
changes to the corporation (mergers) or to its constitutional documents (amend-
ments to the certificate of incorporation).
This sharply limited role for shareholder voting is consistent with the board-
centered model of corporate governance. In such a system, one could be rather
complacent about voting problems in mergers and charter amendments, regard-
less of the direction of distortion. If the board recommends a merger, and,
200. EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 178, para. 35.7.
201. Gilchrist Sparks III, Partner, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware,
Personal Oral Communication to Author.
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through some voting failure, the merger is approved even though a proper count
would have led to a rejection, a proponent of board-centered corporate gover-
nance can argue that the result is acceptable: after all, the board did in fact
recommend the merger and many (if not quite the requisite majority) of
shareholders voted in favor. Similarly, when a merger is rejected even though an
accurate count would have resulted in approval, one could be comfortable with
this result too: in the extreme case in which the board is so out of step with the
shareholders that it tries to push a deal over determined opposition of more than
45% of the shareholders, it is no tragedy that the deal fails, even if, in fact, more
than 50% of the votes were cast in favor. Put differently, the veto role of
shareholder voting in mergers or charter amendments may not really require
complete accuracy.
But what about director elections? Here, complacency is harder to sustain,
even from a board-centered view. The board of directors have significant
managerial powers and enjoy the protections of the business judgment rule.
Elections to the board, as the sole governance check on the board, play a central
ideological and monitoring role within corporate governance. An election sys-
tem that generates inaccurate results and fails to provide transparency and
verifiability will eventually undermine its own legitimacy.
A recognition of the problems and limits of the corporate voting system has
three implications for the current place of shareholder voting in the Delaware
jurisprudence. First, as Gilson and Schwartz pointed out, much of Delaware’s
approach to takeovers post-Moran has had the effect, and arguably the purpose,
of channeling disputes over control from market contests (tender offers) to
election contests (proxy fights over the advisability of pulling the poison
pill).202 The infirmities of the voting system provide support for Gilson and
Schwartz’s skepticism of this shift.
Second, the traditional Delaware default rule, which requires only that direc-
tors receive a plurality of the votes cast rather than a majority,203 minimizes the
occasions in which a director contest ends indecisively. By changing to a
majority rule, the potential for uncertain outcomes increases. Under plurality
voting, the number of votes received in director elections—and thus the need
for accuracy and verifiability—matters only in the relatively few contested
elections. With majority voting, the number of votes matters in every single
election, and the number of close votes is bound to increase dramatically. This
will greatly increase the pressure to find a better way to deal with the hanging
chads of corporate voting.
Finally, given the problems with the existing system, one should not rush to
expand the opportunities for shareholder voting in corporate governance. The
question whether to expand the opportunities for shareholders to vote is inescap-
202. Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Sales and Elections as Methods for Transferring Corporate
Control, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 783, 787–88 (2001).
203. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (Supp. 2006).
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ably linked to the quality of the corporate voting system. If we want sharehold-
ers to vote on more things, we need to improve the system. But, as we have
shown here, substantially improving the system is non-trivial. Although mar-
ginal ameliorations are clearly possible, a fundamental transformation requires a
realignment of our system of securities ownership, a change that is expensive
and uncertain, both practically and politically. In the absence of such restructur-
ing, we would be well advised to channel our limited resources into ensuring
accurate and verifiable results for the votes we already have, rather than
expanding the number of issues on which shareholders vote.
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